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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Till~~ ~'1'.\TJ£ <H, urr.\H, 
Plai11l-iff a}l(/ Rf'SJJourleut, 
\'S. 
.H~.\~ ~li\< iL.\ IH, 
Deff'udanf a11rl ApjJellant. 
Case No. 
9971 
BRIEF Q~F APP·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jean Sinclair appeals from a conviction for the crime 
of first degree murder of Don LeRoy Foster in violation 
of 76-30-3, UCA 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on a charge of first degree mur-
der before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt La:ke County, Utah, with Judge Marcellus 
K. Snow presiding. After three weeks' trial the jury 
returned a verdict of first degree murder with recom-
mendation of leniency. Motion for new trial was filed 
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with supporting and counter affidavits being filed, wa~ 
argued to the Court and denied. The Appellant was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and appeals from the verdict 
and judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHIT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks relief in the alternative; (a) n·-
versal and discharge, (b) reversal and remand for a new 
trial with directions to the trial court. 
S'TATEMENT OF FACTS 
Due to the extensive testimony and great length of 
the record, the Statement of Facts is set forth in two 
parts; first, that evidence relative to the killing of Don 
LeRoy Foster including tiine, location, method and means 
of killing, and the cause of death. There is little material 
conflict as to these portions of the evidence and it is 
clear that there was a killing by felonious n1eans in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, on January 4th or 5th, 1963, \Yith 
proper identification of the deceased. 
Second portion of the staten1ent of facts relates to 
the connection of the defendant, if any, with the crime 
charged, and is necessarily set forth in some detail by 
setting forth the material facts testified to hy eac·h 
witness in the order which the presentation was made 
in the District Court. This is done due to the vital ques-
tions before this Court concerning sufficiency of evi-
dence and corroboration of the clain1ed accomplice. 
Don LeRoy Foster \vas :killed about 12:30 a.m., Jan-
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uary ;>, 1963 ut tlw ~m;an Kay ..:\.rm:; aparbnent parking 
lot in Salt Lake City, l"tah. Cause of death w.a:; a gun 
shot wound on tl1P right side of the face, neck and shoul-
der { lt 357 ). TIH· gun \\·as a shot gun, apparently a 12 
~au~P. containing number 5 shot. The gauge of the gun 
was dete11uined frmn wad:; recovered frmn the central 
wound (H. :~ti-t-), which were identified by an FBI fire 
arms expPrt (H. -199-500). The wound severed the carotid 
artery, both jugular veins, and damaged the spinal cord 
(H. 361). A combination of these injuries was the cause 
of death. The shot left a center pattern 7 inches in di-
ameter (H. 357). r:rhere were also shot punctures in the 
dorstml of the right hand (R. 359). The shot would nec-
essarily have been fired within 15 feet, probably less 
(R. -H.i7). There is no wa~· of determ:ining fron1 what 
weapon shot or wads were fired in an unrifled weapon 
(R. 31:2). 
Foster was a Inarried n1an estranged from his wife . 
.. :\ divorce adion was filed son1e 16 months previous to 
his death and had lain donnant since that tilne (R. 1082). 
Foster operated a service station at Second West and 
X orth Temple streets and had lived at the Susan Kay 
Ann~ aparhnents since February, 1962. On the evening 
of ~January -1, 1963, he had been to dinner at Alex Broiler 
on Third South between :Main and \Vest Temple streets 
in ~alt Lake City and to a 1novie at the Capitol Theatre 
on Second South between niain and West Temple streets 
with LaRae Peterson and her 8-year-old daughter, Cheryl 
Ann. After leaving the theatre they took the child to a 
baby ~itter below Thirty-third South on West Temple. 
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They proceeded frmn here to the Prescription Pharmacy 
on :Main Street where Foster purchased some bufferin, 
then north on ~:fain street to Center street, along Center 
street to Fifth North where they turned into the parking 
lot of the Susan Kay Arms apartment. Foster pulled 
the automobile into a parking spot in front of the garage, 
the parking spot not being that assigned to his apart-
lnent, and being immediately north of the six-foot chain 
link fence. The deceased got out of the car, reached over 
the back seat to pick up his overcoat and straightened 
up when ~lrs. Peterson heard an explosion, saw a flash 
through the left rear window and saw ~-,oster slide down 
the fence to the black-top between the fence and the auto--
mobile. She got out of the car and ran around the front 
of the car screan1ing, "my God, he shot himself." She 
did not see anyone in the immediate vicinity and did 
not hear anyone running away. She knelt down, put 
Foster's head in her lap and tried to stop the flow of 
blood. She looked for a gun but she said she did not 
find one. However, witness Gerretadina Combee and 
her husband Pieter Combee, who arrived at the scene of 
the shooting with a flashlight on the other side of the 
fence shortly after they heard the shot, testified that 
they saw l\Irs. Peterson hand a small pistol to an un-
identified man standing in the shadows towards the front 
of the car from where :Mrs. Peterson was kneeling. 
Witness John Storey arrived where Foster was 15 
seconds after he heard a shot followed by screams. He 
cante around the corner of an apartment to the north 
and could see clear to the street but saw no one leaving 
the area nor did he see any person until he saw Mrs. 
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Peter::ion kneeling and holding the deceased's head. 1m-
mediately thereafter many p(_}ople gathered fro1n sur-
rounding apartments. 
rrhe police were called and arrived at 12 :40 a.n1., 
eondncted an investigation and took pictures. 
La.lVlar B. \Villiams, an off-duty police officer, was 
at the north end of the Susan Kay apartlnents on the 
enrly morning of January 5th visiting his ex-wife (R. 
~)77). He was leaving about 12:25 a.m. and had trouble 
::-tarting his ear. He saw a person coming out of the 
archway and as he backed out he observed the facial 
features in his rear view mirror (R. 979). Hair on the 
darker side, quite wavy in front going straight back, a 
long nose, receding chin line with a cleft chin. The per-
~on resembled Jean Sinclair. The person was dressed in 
dark trousers and light short coat coming somewhere 
between the ~{nees and the crotch. He can't identify the 
type of coat. When faced by :Miss Sinclair he achnitted 
that her ehin wasn't cleft or in an S curve. Her hair was 
not dark. The person he saw weighed between 165 and 
180 lbs. and appeared to be a man (R. 983). 
Boyd K. Harvey was driving home in the late hours 
of January 4th or early 1norning of January 5th, 1963. 
He wa:-; driving along Fifth X orth street between Second 
and First \Vest. He heard a shot, a scream and saw a 
person running from the Susan Kay apartments drive-
way (R. 985). This person was wearing a three-quarter 
length car coat ending above the knees. He didn't see 
the head clearly. The person was running from the fence 
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across the lawn carrying an object high in his right hand 
away from the body. The object was 18 to 24 inches long 
(R. 987). ·The person appeared to be very agile and was 
running fast. ·The man ran across the parking lot on 
Fifth North and got into the passenger side of a vehicle 
which drove away before the witness could make a U 
turn and get close enough to get the license plate number. 
lie described the person 5 ft. 6 in. to 5 ft. 10 in., burly 
and heavy set. He told the police the running person 
was a man. He didn't consider .a woman until he read 
about Miss Sinclair in the newspapers (R. 988). The 
automobile which the person entered was a two-tone 
Chevrolet sedan, 1954 or 1955. ~rhe person's trousers 
were darker than the coat. ·The person was "very agile, 
running without deformities. I thought it was a man." 
(R. 990). 
·The State's case is centered on the testimony of Carl 
Kuehne, who, after being picked up on two different 
occasions by the police at the instance of V .aughn Hum-
phreys, and held overnight on the second occasion, made 
a statement that would tend to implicate the defendant 
in the crime. Carl Kuehne testified he has been con-
victed of a felony, assault with .a deadly weapon, about 
1952, and confined in the Utah State Prison. While there 
he escaped from a fire fighting detail in 1958. He is 
a mathematics major .at the University of Utah with a B 
ave.rage. He met Miss Sinclair through Vaughn Hum-
phreys in October of 1960 and went deer hunting with 
:Miss Sinclair, Humphreys and other persons. That he 
didn't see the defendant thereafter until August, 1962. 
(Fnur ( 4) other witnesses, including State's witness 
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llwuphn·y:.;, indica tt•d that he ~a w her vanous ti1nes 
uul'ing 1.961 (H. ;)~:;). 1\..uehne test II i~._·d that on the first 
meeting in 19ti:2 he told her he had a post office clearance 
(H. j:27), wht-reupon he began a di:-;eu:-;sion with her re-
garding what should be done with a person who wa~ cau~­
ing a woman to 1nistreat her child (H.. ;)2~-29) and she 
uft't>rPd hun $500.00 to kill the person but did not identify 
him (It ;>:29). Don Foster was not 1nentioned during the 
fir~t conversation. K.uehne first saw Foster late in Oc-
tober, 1962 (R. ;)32). (This is contradicted by LaRae 
L'etenwn's testinwny that a person na1ned Stewart (the 
name used by 1\:euhne) caine to the Susan l(ay apart-
ment~ to talk to Foster on the 23rd of September, 1962.) 
Kuelme ::;aid he did not see the defendant frmn Septenl-
ber to Ootober just before deer season, but on cross 
examination admitted receiving a check from her on 
Odober 7, 1962 (R. 611). He went to three (3) places 
with the defendant to detennine the best place to kill 
Fo~ter (R. 50-1), to-wit: .Mrs. Turner's (Foster's 
mother's home). Kuehne testified it was 3 to 4 1niles 
we~t of the nursing home (R. 540). (Mrs. Turner 
tP~tified her hmne is 1:Y2 blocks west of the 
nursing home.) LaRae Peterson's home in Kearns which 
he described as red brick (R. 539), (LaRae Peterson 
testified her hon1e in Kearns is light grey cinder block 
(R. 813).), and the Susan Kay apartments where Foster 
and LaRae Peterson were living. 
He went to Foster's apartment at defendant's re-
que:_.;t to beat him up. 
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(R. 549) and told Foster to leave LaHae Peterson alonP 
so he could marry her. He said he had never seen Foster 
until late October (R. 531, 619-20). (LaRae Petpr~on 
placed the date that l{uehne came to the apartment 
under the name of Stewart as September 23, 19G:2 (R. 
839-40.) Kuehne further stated that the defendant 
brought him to the Susan Kay apartment when he went 
to talk to Foster and waited across the road. He had 
only seen Foster once. (Four ( 4) witnesses, including 
State's witness LaRae Peterson, testified the defendant 
was in California or on her way to California on Sep~ 
tember 23, 1962.) On December 28, 1962 at defendant's 
request he bought a used 12-gauge shot gun and a box 
of No. 5 shells at Lee's Loans on Second South between 
State and Main (R. 571). He gave a false name, George 
Stewart, and a false address, Elko, Nevada. vVhen asked 
why, he stated "Just a little bit of caution on my part 
since the king had been threatening to kill Don Foster." 
Kuehne testified to many conversations with the de-
fendant with regard to killing Foster but cannot place 
any dates (R. 601-2), with the exception of December 28, 
1962 when he bought the shot gun and January 4, 1963 
when he testified that the defendant came to his home 
three (3) times, the first about 6:00p.m. o'cloc:k when she 
left the shot gun to be sawed off. He said Jean arrived 
the second time about 8 :30 p.m., received some leather 
goods he had made for her, wrote out a check, Exhibit 
No. 33, in his presence. (The check is dated January 
3, 1963.) He showed her how to load the gun and how 
to put it on safety. She wrapped the gun in "what he 
found out later was a white coat" and said she was 
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going to ukill Iny~elf a ~on-of-a-biteh" and left after 
11:00 p.m. (H. :)78-79). She wa~ dre~~ed in fleece-lined 
hoot;-;, gr·t·y flannl•l panb, whitP ~hirt and a hlue parka 
(R. 580). 
When she left he went to bed, woke up and Jean 
wa~ standing by the stove warming her hands. 'rhe shot 
gun was in the corner. She was dressed as before, but 
wearing the white trench coat. There was dirt and 
grease on the coat and right leg of the pants (R. 584. 
rrhe coat hung below her knees (R. 585). She told hiiu 
she had .. :killed the son-of-a-bitch. LaRae was present 
but just screamed." Jean said she couldn't get up to the 
chain link fence and had to crawl under a car. She 
told the witness he was an accon1plice before and after 
the fact and had to get rid of the gun (R. 586). She 
made a phone call and left. l-Ie walked out to the car 
with her, returned, took the gun apart., put it in a sack 
with the shells fr01n which he had emptied the shot 
beween Jean's first and second visits (R. 656), he took 
the sack out behind the garage ( R. 586-89). When he 
returned to the house he looked at the clock and it was 
1.00 a.m. (R. 631). His wife returned about 3.00 a.m. 
and after eating and helping one of her friends move, 
hi~ wife drove hiin up Emigration Canyon where he 
disposed of the gun parts and shells by throwing then1 
from the road towards the creek at various intervals. 
(R. 589-91). He returned home and shaved off his beard 
of j months (R. 5~):2). He showed the police where 'he 
had thro\vn the gun parts and shells, and after they 
had been unsuccessful in attempts to find them on the 
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25th or 26th of February during a recess in the prelim-
inary hearing, following a policeman telling him the,· 
were getting a detachment of National Guardsmen to 
search the area, Kuehne took Vaughn Humphrey8 up 
the Canyon. They were unaccompanied hy polie<' or 
other persons. They found the gun stock, Exhibit No. 21, 
in the creek bed and brought it to the police station 
(R. 604, 639-40). On cross examination he admitted he 
could not place any conversation with Jean as to time 
and place (R. 608). He can't place the meeting with 
Don Foster, even to the month (R. 621). His testimony 
varied many times from his testimony in the preliminary 
hearing (R. 631, 645, 646, 648, 650, 654, 663, 667, 668, 
669, 670, 671, 676). The police 1nade him no threats or 
promises, but they did hold him over night and they 
discussed with him the possibility of getting a pardon 
for his previous felony. He saw no person other than 
the defendant between 6.00 p.n1., January 4th and 3 :00 
to 3:30 a.n1., January 5th, 1963. On each occasion when 
a question was asked concerning the shot gun and the 
shells, Kuehne tried to claim privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment.* 
The District Attorney elicited testimony as to a 
previous felony record of Kuehne and an escape from 
a pri8on work detail together with a voluntary return 
(R. 521-22. The Court refused to let defense counsel 
pursue this question on cross examination (R. 694). 
7.'(Each time, the court compelled him to answer (R. 569-
76-87-88). Apparently on the basis that he had waived his 
privilege by testifying at the preliminary hearing CR. 570).) 
10 
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l'ounMel madt- a Prof'ft·r of Proof (It 117 to 1:>1. 7:>s. 
7:1~1). Tht- ( 'ourt refused to allow counsel to pur~uP 
Kuehnt•':-; p:-;yt·h ia t rie background (R. G9G). Again a 
Proffer ot' Proof wa:-; Inade (H. 711-138, 739). 
Vaughn Hu1nphreys testified that he had known the 
defendant for 1;>-yPars through her partner's son Bill 
Rawlins ( 1\. 719). He had known LaRae Peterson for 
7 or S years but had never been out with her (R. 720). 
He had known Carl Kuehne since the early spring of 
1960 ... was a friend of K.uehne and had introduced 
Kuehne to Jean Sinclair in the fall of 1960 when they 
wPnt deer hunting with a group of people. In the summer 
and fall of 1962 he had several discussions with Jean 
regarding Don Fosters going with LaRae Peterson. Jean 
wa~ worried about LaRae's daughter Cheryl Ann aNd 
wanted the Foster-Peterson relationship terminated. (R. 
i~5-~(}). He contacted officers on bYo (2) different 
oc.casions trying to get them to do something about 
breaking up the relationship (R. 727, 730, 731). Jean 
talked with \T aughn about adopting Cheryl Ann. He 
s.aid she talked to him about it being a good idea to 
disguise as Danites, catch Foster and threaten to cas-
trate him (R. 733-34). Humphreys was at the Susan 
Kay Arms on New Years Eve, 1962 (R. 735). He had 
disru~sed getting dates with LaRae Peterson with Jean 
but she told him LaRae "·as too expensive for him (R. 
736). In Xoven1ber he learned from Carl Kuehne of a 
plot to kill Foster and to leave his (Vaughn's) hunting 
jacket at the scene of the killing. Thereafter he didn't 
go around the rest home again until he went to see 
Bill Rawlins at Christmas (R. 7-12). He never discussed 
11 
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the matter of the jacket with Jean and didn't bother 
to pick up his jacket (R. 142). He didn't mention Jean 
to either of the officers he contacted about breaking up 
the Foster-Peterson relationship. He had made the com-
ment about Foster- "that son-of-a-bitch is getting some 
of that and I'm not" (R. 747). LaRae Peterson had gone 
with several men to Vaughn's knowledge ·w:hile she had 
the beauty shop at the rest home (R. 749). He told 
Kuehne that Jean was a lesbian while on the original 
deer hunt in October, 1962 (R. 749), based on her interest 
in LaRae Peterson and her interest in Cheryl Ann'8 
welfare (R. 751-52). 
He had an argument with Jean in a cafe in Provo, 
Utah in the latter part of November and stopped going 
to her place (R. 755-56). He talked with her once on 
the phone in December, 1962 when she accused him of 
spreading rumors that she was a lesbian. He denied 
to her that he had said anything of such nature (R. 756). 
Ellen Rawlins was equally concerned about the child 
Cheryl Ann's welfare as was the defendant (R. 757). 
Vaughn and Bill Rawlins had called Jean "the King" 
for 13 or 14 years because she "ruled the roost" (R. 758). 
No one else called her King (R. 758). He overheard 
a conversation between Jean and Thayle Olsen regarding 
Jean's affection for LaRae and concern for Cheryl Ann 
(R. 762). He didn't recall what was said in the conversa-
tion (R. 763). 
LaRae Peterson testified she is divorced and the 
mother of a 9-year-old child (R. 767). She ran a beauty 
shop in the defendant's rest home from October 1956 
12 
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to October, 1Uti:2. ~lw took care of the patients' hair in 
return for rent and utilities and also had her own 
t•ustomers. ,Jean and her partner Ellen cared for the 
child while LaRae was working (R. 769). LaRae left 
the rest home on October 6, 1962 to be closer to Don 
Foster's work and to take special training from Kay 
Butters (R. 769). She knew \'aughn IIumphreys for 
7 or S years ... she had never seen C.arl Kuehne until 
the preliminary hearing (R. 770). Both Ellen and Jean 
had given her money and groceries (R. 773). She knew 
Foster's divorce was not final and h.ad not gone to 
eourt (R. 775). She had gone on trips with Jean and 
had visited Jean at a motel (R. 776). She had never 
seen Jean follow her (R. 779). She h.ad been followed 
but never looked for any one car in particular (R. 779). 
\Vhen asked by the District Attorney if she had com-
mitted any lesbian acts with Jean Sinclair she stated 
on voir dire that she didn't know what lesbian acts were 
and didn't know if homosexual acts between women were 
possible.• 
She kept clothes at Foster's aparbnent at the Susan 
Kay apartments and parked her car in Foster's assigned 
parking stall. She identfied a note, Exhibit No. 30, as 
being in Jean's handwriting and said she found it at the 
~lwp some time between Christmas, 1961 and April 28, 
*The District Attorney asked if she had had any homosexual 
acts with Jean Sinclair. Defense counsel objected on the grounds 
of ambiguity and immateriality, but objection was overruled 
and the witness claimed privilege under 78-24-9, U.C.A. The 
Court directed her to answer. She refused, and the Court in-
formed her she would be held in contempt. She still refused 
1 R. 787-88). 
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1962 after she started going with Don Foster (R. 794).*"" 
She talked with Jean about 5:00p.m. on Jaunary 4, 
1963 by telephone and told her that she, Don and Cheryl 
Ann were going to a show. She doesn't think she told 
Jean what show or what ti1ne ( R. 797). She called 
again about 7:30 p.m. at the rest home but Jean waH 
not in (R. 797). LaRae and her daughter went to the 
Susan Kay apartments, left her car in the north parking 
lot and went to Don's apartment (R. 799). The three 
(3) went to Alex Broiler, had dinner, and went to the 
show at the Capitol ·Theatre. They left the show and 
took Cheryl Ann to Morgan Pace's on West Temple. 
LaRae and Don proceeded to the Prescription Pharmacy, 
then north on Main to Center street, along Centc•r street 
to Fifth north and into the Susan Kay parking lot from 
the Fifth north entrance (R. 801). Foster pulled into 
the parking space by the garage, opened the car door, 
picked up his overcoat from the back seat and started 
to close the door. LaRae heard a loud noise, saw a 
flash through the left rear window, and Foster slipped 
down the fence (R. 803). She got out, and around the 
front of the car and !knelt down and put his head in her 
lap (R. 804). She didn't see anyone at the time of the 
shooting and didn't see anyone leaving the area (R. 821). 
The parking space where the shooting occurred was not 
Foster's regular parking place. The apartment manager'::; 
-):--:'In an affidavit filed on Motion for a new trial (R. 119-20), she 
recanted this testimony recollecting that the note had been 
received by her some two (2) years earlier. 
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:-;on also u~eu it (H. SJ ~). Fo~ter had a new ear. LaRae 
had nl'Vl'l' tolu Jean about the new car (H. 813). LaHae':-; 
home in Kearns i:-; grey cinder block . . . it had never 
bePn n·d (H. Sl~). ~l.rs. Turner (Don Foster':-; .Jlother), 
lin·~ on Sunset avenue between .Jlain and \Vest Temple 
str.-ds (R. Sl-!). Foster normally carried a gun in the 
car (R. S~~). LaRae thought at first he had shot himself. 
~he has never ~een Jean run (R. 823). She had never 
~een Jean act out physically or harm any person or 
animal. Jean frequently wore western type clothes. 
La It at> had gone with several other men while working 
at the rest home and had planned to marry .Jlr. Craven. 
The contemplated marriage created no problem with 
Jean (R.831). LaRae, Cheryl Ann and Foster went to 
the \Vorlds Fair in Septe1nber, 1962 (R. 833). 
LaRae licensed the beauty shop at the rest home 
for 1963 after ~he had moved out on October 6, 1962 
~H. 833). ~he returned thereafter to do the patients' 
hair (R. s:~-1- ). She talked with Jean about leaving after 
Jean returned from California early in October, 1962. 
There was never any trouble between Foster and Jean 
Sinelair (R. 837). Foster's divorce, to her knowledge, 
had been filed for a year and 3 Inonths but had not 
g-o1w to court at the time of his death . 
. :\ person identifying hilnself as George Stewart 
crune to Foster's apartn1ent while LaRae was there on 
the evening of Sunday, September 23rd or :Monday, 
September ~-!th, 1962 and talked to Foster about leaving 
LaRae alone. LaRae placed the tin1e as during a beauty 
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convention she \Yas attending at the Terrace Ballroom 
(R. 839). Jean was in California delivering a hor~l' 
at this time (R. 840). LaRae never had an argument 
or harsh words with Jean regarding Foster (R. 841). 
She saw Jean drive past Foster's Inother's home on 
Mothers Day, 1962 (R. 842). ~he took down the license 
number of a car which was following her after the :kill-
ing. The car was a 1954 or 1955 2-tone Chevrolet.* 
Jean owned a brown deer skin jacket (R. 844). 
Loren Hallen testified he is a bank officer at the 
First Security Bank where Jean Sinclair has an account. 
He identified two (2) checks on the Sinclair account 
dated in January, 1963 with the earlier date being on tlw 
higher numbered check (R. 855). 
Ned Greenig, Court Reporter, testified to a conver-
sation in the Courts chambers in which the defendant 
stated she had never been to the Susan Kay Apartments 
(R. 858). The statement was not made under oath but 
was part of a conversation between counsel ( R. ~5H) .) 
David Wetzel testified he met Sinclair at Carl 
Kuehne's apartment on December 28, 1962. The three 
of them talked about a half hour. She had a bottle 
of Irish whiskey with her. She was dressed in jeans 
and a shirt. The witness left about 10:30 p.m. (R. 863). 
LaRae Kuehne testified she is thf' wife of Car1 
*The license was identified as registered to Mel Humphreys, 
Vaughn Humphreys' father. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kuehne and a waitress at the Tiki Hut on Second South. • 
8he knows Jean Sinclair. Jean wanted her to call Don 
Foster to get hi1n up to the rest hmne to watch J·ean 
tutu LaRae Peterson in "the lesbian act" (R. 869). She 
went to work on January -!that 6:00p.m. She came home 
at 3 :00 a.m. January 5, 1963. Her husband was in bed. 
They went to breakfast, returned home, got the pieces of 
a shot gun, drove up Emigration Canyon where her 
hu~band threw them away. When they returned home 
Carl Kuelme shaved off his beard (R. 872). 
Kenneth Forsberg owns Lee's Loans, a pawn shop 
on Second South between State and .Main in Salt Lake 
City, Utah (R. 888). On December 28, 1962 he sold a 
~~-gauge shot gun and a box of No. 5 12-gauge shells 
to a person who identified himself as George Stewart of 
Elko, Xevada (R. 889). George Stewart appeared to be 
the same person as a newspaper picture of Carl Kuehne, 
8ans beard ( R. 890). 
Yal Jean Pace works at Grand Central Market. She 
knows Jean Sinclair, LaRae Peterson and Don Foster 
(R. 896). She had a conversation with Jean in December, 
1962 in which Jean hoped LaRae would cmne back and 
work at the beauty shop. If she did, Jean would help 
her get a car (R. 8!17). 
Gerritadina Cmubee lives with her husband at :250 
\\"est 5th X orth inunediately south of the spot where 
;<The Tiki Hut is immediately west of the Capitol Theatre where 
Foster went to the movies on the night of the killing. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Don Foster was shot (R. 899). Sometime around C!trist-
Inas, 1962 she sa,,- a woman in a fringed leather jadi:t•t 
and trousers walking south fron1 the Susan Kay parking 
lot. She identified that person as the defendant (R. 903). 
On cross examination she admitted she ~aw the person 
from the right rear and only for "a step or 4 or ;>'' 
(R. 9'18). She never saw the face (R. 921), and couldn't 
describe the hair color or clothing other than the fringhl 
jacket She later in the trial identified Jean ~ineln ir's 
jacket as the type and color she had seen. 
Ellen McHenry testified she had been Jean Sin-
clair's partner at the rest home business since 1946. 
She remarried on October 11. 1962 (R. 92~). She is still 
at the rest home daily (R. 923). She raised her three 
(3) children at the rest home "-ith ~Tean's help Her 
invalid husband also lived there until his death in 1949. 
I-Ier son Bill's 12-gauge shot gun is at the rest home 
and has been there for years (R. 933). Jean owns a 
brown leather 1ac.ket but has never owned a trench coat. 
Jean does have a full length ivory-colored leather coat 
(R. 925-26). ~i[ost of the Silver Spurs (a women's riding 
club to which both Jean and the witness belong) have 
fringed leather jackets silnilar to Jean's ( R. 928). 
Kenyon Donaldson in company with John Harwood, 
both City Water Department surveyors, found a shot 
gun barrel in Emigration Canyon on March 25, 1963 
about 50' from the road in a sn1all clearing. 
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Joe Long~on, police ddedin:•, identfied ~hot gun 
~hells found by himself and others in his presence in 
~~migration Canyon, Exhibit No. 16. 
Glen Cahoon, Det. Sgt. Salt Lake City Police De-
parttm•nt, identified a eardboard shot gun shell box 
found by him in Emigration Canyon, Exhibit No. 17 (R. 
~~:">:!-;>:~). Although there had been hip-deep snow between 
January 4th and the finding of the box, the box didn't 
appear to have been wet or water damaged (R. 957). 
There had been several careful searches by officers in 
the area indicated to them by Kuehne, including the use 
of mine detectors, with no part of the gun being fotmd, 
but certain shells were found (R. 959-60). 
The area in which Kuehne and Humphreys claimed 
they found the gun stock, Exhibit No. 21, is not one of 
the area~ where Kuehne told the officers to search (R. 
963). Cahoon had told Kuehne two (2) days before 
Kuehne and flumphreys found the gun stock that the 
police were going to take at least 100 National Guards-
men and comb the area (R. 973). 
LaMar Bowen vVillian1s' testi1nony is set forth in 
the first portion of the Statement of Fact as is that of 
Royd I\:. Harvey. 
Joyce Harris testified she works for a cleaners 
in .Murray. On the 1norning of January 5th Jean Sin-
clair brought in some cleaning including several pairs 
of trousers, several sweaters, and a coat and a jacket. 
The coat was a tan trench coat. She checked the pockets 
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and put the clothes in a bin. Jean frequently brought 
in clothes to be cleaned, both her and the patients. Tlw 
witness didn't notice anything unusual about the coat. 
Jean didn't return for the clothes for several dayH 
(R. 999). 
Orvis Allred works as a cleaner in .Murray. On 
the afternoon of January 5th he examined a coat with 
8alt Lake City police officer Paul ( R. 1001). The 
coat was a tan overcoat, full length as differentiated 
from three-quarters. The officer had him check spots 
on the coat to see if they were blood. It was not blood. 
The spots were not excessive. They seemed to be an oil 
type stain. One pair of trousers were stained (R·. 1004). 
The largest spots on the coat were about the size of a 
quarter. There were no spots on the arms or sides (R. 
1005). Jean picked up the clothes several days later. 
They were not impounded (R. 1006). 
Alex Paul is an officer of the Salt Lake City police 
department. He was sent to the Murray cleaners to 
examine some clothes on January 5th, 1963. He saw 
a tan trench coat three-quarter length with buttons on 
the right s~ide. It came to the knee area or below-had 
marks underneath the arm, on the arms and on the 
bottom near the seam. Also on the back area (R. 1008). 
Some spots were the size of a dinner plate or larger. 
A grey pair of pants with dirt in the knee area and 
around the cuff were also exmnined (R. 1009). The 
dirt was kind of gray with darker spots. The coat 
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The State reHted. 
Defendant n1ade a motion to dismiss (H. 1005) Pt 
Defendant's Case: 
Phillip Procter testified he works for the motor 
vehicle divi~ion in the State Tax Com1nission. He identi-
fied Exhibit -Hi, a registration showing Mel Hmnphrey~ 
at ~1 <i-t- South -1-th East, Salt Lake City to be the reg-
h;tered owner of a 1954 Chevrolet 4-door sedan \vith 
license number Utah 1963 - D9207. \Vas issued on 
February ~:2, 1963 (R. 1034). 
John Pulsipher is frmn Las Vegas, Nevada and 
knows Carl Kuehne. He had three (3) conversations 
with Kuehne in which Kuehne stated he was a Nazi 
prisoner of war for 2 years. vVhen he ca1ne home his 
wife had a 9-month old baby daughter. Kuehne said he 
killed them both adding "if they can't find the bodies 
they can't convict nobody of any crime" (R. 1008). On 
cross examination he testified that Kuehne bro:ke up 
hi~ first marriage. He doesn't know Jean Sinclair -
never saw her before he walked into the court room. 
Carl R. Andreasen is a Naturopathic physician and 
surgeon, in private practice for 22 years, 10 years being 
in Utah. He is licensed to practice medicine in Utah. 
He has known Jean Sinclair since 1954. Jean has con-
:'ulted him about a reducing program for the last 3 years 
tR. 101:2). She has lost weight continually for those 
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three years but nwre rapidly in the sununer of 1962 
when she was having dental problems (R. 1013). She 
has residuals from a spinal fusion giving her numbne~~ 
in the lower extre1nities and difficulty in walking. Dr. 
Andreasen has treated her for injuries from falls. He 
has never seen ~Iiss Sinclair run. It is his opinion 
that she cannot run (R. 1060). The opinion is based on 
her spinal injury, loss of sensation in the legs and 
bladder, and being unable to feel what is undPr the soles 
of her feet. Her reputation in the community for being 
peaceful and law abiding is good (R. 1018). On cross 
examination he stated she might play golf but couldn't 
hit the ball very far. She could not 1nove as fast as the 
normal person could walk (R. 1016). The lad~ of bal-
ance is partially compensated by eye sight. 
Counsel for the parties stipulated that the divorce 
action - Don Leroy Foster vs. Beth W orthin Foster wa:-
filed in the Third District Court in October, 1961. 
Answer and counter claim was filed November 13, 1961. 
No further pleading had been filed at Foster's death 
on January 5, 1963 (R. 1082). 
Ellen McHenry testified she had been in the nursing 
home business with Jean Sinclair since 1946. Both part-
ners lived at the nursing home until October, 1962 when 
Ellen married Bill McHenry. Her three children were 
raised at the nursing home and her former husband 
lived there until his death (R. 101-:1:). Ellen is still at 
the nursing home evenT day. She has never se,en Jean 
run or get on a horse without assistance. She has known 
LaRae Peterson for 8 years. LaRae started a beauty 
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:-;hop at the uur~1 ng home .at Ellen':-; n•q ue~t in 1930. 
Lal:at· did not lin· there and n(•\'Pr ~lept there. LaRae·~ 
daughter ('hpryl .\nn ~tayed over night h\·ice (R. 1081). 
Tht> shop and Pquipment were furnished by the nursing 
home und LaHae furnished supplies for doing the pa-
tit·nt~' hair (I\. 1088). I~llen and Jean too:k care of ihe 
t•hild. ThPy had had di~eussions about the child and 
the adver~P pffect the Foster-Peterson relationship was 
huvi.ng on thP <·hild (R. 1090). Ellen and Thayle Olson 
hired a detectivt> to follow LaRae (R. 1091). They 
di<ln't tell J e.an about the detective. Ellen paid the bill. 
~he has known Huu1phreys since 1946 or 1947 as a 
friend of lwr son Bill (R. 1093). Only Bill and Yauglm 
PVPI' called Jean the l(ing (R. 1093). Kuehne \ras at 
tht> nur~ing home tiJany tinws in 1961 (R. 1904). Part 
of tlw time while Jean was there (R. 1095). Kuehne 
nPn•r referred to Jean as ''l(ing" until after Foster's 
shooting (R. 1095). Yaughn I-Iumphreys was at the 
nursing home at frequent inversals. The witness heard 
Humphreys ask LaRae for dates both before and after 
lw went in the army. Htunphreys always inquired about 
LaHae wlwn he cmne (R. 1096). Humphreys brought 
up the ~nbject of adoption of Cheryl Ann - not Jean, 
and it wa~ in Elllen ·~ presence. Ellen and Jean had never 
di:·wn~~ed adoption other than that occasion (R. 1099). 
It wa~ Humphreys' idea to contact the police to break 
up Foster and Peterson (R. 1101-1102) . 
. Jean signed bank checks in blank and Jean, Ellen 
t)r her ch'tnghter Joane would fill them in (R.1102-1106) ). 
St'mrtimes a lower nun1bered' check would be filled in 
several days after a higher nun1bered check (R. 1107). 
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On January 4th Ellen saw Jean in the afternoon at the 
nursing home. Ellen ·went bowling at l(oler Lanes in 
Sandy and had a phone conversation with Jean about 
9:30 p.m. regarding an injury to Bill Rawlins (R. 1111). 
She was present at a conversation regarding the boo1( 
"The Twenty-Seventh \Yife" when Jean and Vaughn 
discussed Danites, disguises, castration or harm to Don 
Foster were not mentioned (R. 1111). 
Jean went to California to deliver a horse on either 
the 22nd or 23rd of September 1962 (R. 1150). LaRae 
moved out of the beauty shop on October 6th or 7th, 
1962 (R. 1117). Jean was even tempered and never 
used violence even with the children (R. 1119). Hel' 
reputation in the community for being peaceful and law 
abiding is good (R. 1119). Justice of the Peace Mel 
Hu1nphreys is Yaughn Humphreys' father (R. 1120). 
On cross examination she explained the plan of the 
living quarters of the rest home (R. 11:21 et seq) and the 
practice of the business as to writing checks (R. 1182 
et seq). She and Jean discussed personal problems in-
cluding LaRae and Cheryl Ann. Both she and Jean 
were concerned over Cheryl Ann and the effect tlH' 
Foster-Peterson relationship was having on her (R. 
1143). Ellen didn't discuss hiring a detective with Jean 
(R. 1144). She had tu~d Jean she didn't think Foster 
would marry La Rae (R. 1150). Jean wore slacks around 
the nursing home with boots and oxfords with a 2" 
heel. She always wore her hair short. Jean used lipstick 
and liquid 1nakeup when she went out (R. 1165). Jean 
does chores aro,und the farm. Ellen saw Jean bowl 
once in 1947 (R. 1167) Jean can't put a horse in a trailer 
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alonl• and had never owned a man·~ ~mit (H. 11o9). Jean 
had a full length leather coat but never had a white, 
beige or tan trench coat (R. 1181). Vaughn Hu1nphreys 
had a beige trench coat ( lL 1181). So did Ellen'~ sons 
while tlwy were living there (R. 1182). Jean has a blue 
ski jacket (R. 1181). 
Mildred Sinclair testified she is Jean's sister-in-law 
and has lived at the nursing hmne since coming fron1 
California December 2, 1962 (R. 1185). On Januar~· ±, 
I !Hi:~ Jean was hon1e at 4 :30 p.1n. when .Jlildred and 
her husband arrived from Sandy. She left at 6 :30 or 
7:00 o'clock and returned about 7:45 and left again. 
Jean returned home the second time about 8 :30 and 
stayed the balance of the night. They ate pizza and 
watched r_ry, Jean worked on the books (R. 1189). 
~lildred went to bed about 2 :30 a.n1., January 5th after 
helping fix the pills for the patients and feed the dogs 
(H. 1190). Jean was still up when ~Lildred went to bed. 
Slw was never out of ~Eldred's sight for .a period of 
more than 10 Ininutes between 8 :30 p.n1. January 4th 
and ~:30 a.m. on January 5th (R. 1191). She woke Jean 
up on the couch in the living room at 8 :30 a.m. January 
5th (R. 1163). Jean was at ~Eldred's home in California 
the latter part of Septe1nber with a truck and horse 
trailer (R. 1197). ~lildred can't ren1en1ber the T\'" shows 
January 4th except ~I itch l\liller and Jack Paar (R. 
1104-). She saw nurse Reva Nelson at 8:30p.m. while she 
was fixing J e.an's pizza and X urse Eatchell about 1 :00 
and 1 :30 a.m. X urse X elson left at 10 :00 p.m. Mildred's 
husband Lamond woke her up at one time during the 
night (R. 1210) while investigating smne Inusie playing 
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(R. 1212). On the morning of January 5th she heard 
the help talking about Foster's death and LaRae Peter-
son. She woke Jean to find out if it was the smne LaRae 
Peterson who had run the beauty shop (R. 1214). 
Gerretadina Combee was called for the defense. She 
had testified earlier. She and her husband came home on 
January 4th about 12 :00 midnight. She saw a car in 
front of her home with a person on the driver's side. 
She didn't know whether it was a man or woman. While 
she was getting ready for bed she heard a shot (R. 1228). 
She saw someone run around the car screaming "she 
killed me- she killed him- help." She and Mr. Com-
bee ran to the fence. Her husband had a flashlight. 
La Rae Peterson stated "I was thinking he shot hisself. 
Look what he had in his hand." l\1rs. Combee saw a 
small black pistol. LaRae gave it to a man standing near 
the front of the car. Foster was lying on the ground 
shot. Mrs. Combee told the police about the gun (R. 
1231). Pieter Combee echoed his wife's testimon~·. 
Lamond Sinclair testified he is the brother of the 
defendant and has been living at the rest home since 
December 2, 1962 (R. 1249). He never heard Carl 
Kuehne call Jean "King" (R. 1251). On January 4th 
he saw Jean around 5 :00 p.m. in the living room of 
the rest home (R. 1251). Jean left twice in the Buick 
sedan. The station wagon was disabled (R. 1252). She 
left about 7 :00 p.m. and was gone about an hour and 
then left again about 8 :00 for 20 minutes to one-half hour 
she was back before 9:00 o'clock. Lamond, his wife and 
Jean ate pizza and watched TV. Jean did other things 
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(H. 1~;>-t.). ~~~P wa~ ~till there when he Wl'nt to bed 
at'tt>r TV signed off (H. 1:2;>S). Jean wa~ in Chula 
\'ista, California in late September (H. 1:2()0). On the 
night of January -lth ~he was wearing light slacks and 
a jacket. She had one telephone call that evening (R. 
l~(i:~). He remembered the ~liteh _Miller show and the 
Jack Parr ~how. Ill· retired just after TY signed of£ 
(lt l~(i-!). He :-;Ll\\' rl,hehna Eatchell when he got up to 
investigate a noise in the early nwrning hours. Thelma 
was sitting at the dining roo1n table. lie ·went in the 
living room. Jean was asleep in a chair (R. 1266). 
Thayle Olsen tt>~tified she had known Jean since 
1951, SPP~ her occasionally. She had known Vaughn 
Hwnphrey~ since 1952 or 1953. Knows Ellen Rawlins 
and LaRae Peterson (R. 1276). In the smnmer of 1962 
~he hired a dPteetive to follow Peterson and Don Foster. 
~lw did thi~ in coniunction with Ellen Rawlins (R. 1278). 
~he had not told Jean about the detective prior to Jan-
uary ;), 1963. She didn't have a conversation with Jean 
in Yaughn Hun1phreys presence involving LaRae Pet-
t>rson (R. 1~SO). Slw did go to dinner with Jean a'nd 
Humphreys in the fall of 1962 after a football game. 
r aughn drank all her Scotch ( R. 1292). She has never 
:known .Jean to wear a 1nan's suit or a homberg hat (R. 
1~~~)). ~he called Foster's wife and Foster's wife called 
her back (R. 1289). Both Jean and Ellen were good 
friends of LaR.ae Peterson and both were concerned 
n\·t~r Cheryl ~lnn (R. 1293). Jean stayed at Thayle's 
place in Sandy while Thayle was on a trip. Thayle and 
Jean had been on trips to :JI exico together. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Glen Cahoon is a Sgt. of homicide squad .and had 
testified previously. He now testified he saw Kuehne 
first on January 11th. Kuehne was detained 5 or 6 
hours and then put in jail over night and released the 
next morning (R. 1300). Kuehne was not informed of his 
constitutional rights (R. 1301). Cahoon rernemoors a 
conversation regarding a possible pardon for Kuelme 
on a former felony charge in Utah (R. 1302). Kuehne 
was never arrested as an accessory or accomplice 
though the police knew he h.ad procured and disposed of 
the shells and weapon ( R. 1304).) Jean Sinclair was 
brought to the police station for questioning on January 
9th and questioned for 2-¥2 hours. She was questioned 
regarding her relationship with LaR.ae Peterson and 
Don Foster (R. 1309-10). She didn't refuse to answer 
any question (R. 1310). She submitted to a polygraph 
test (R. 1311). She was released that evening (R. 1314). 
Vaughn Humphreys was in ·on January 11th and went 
with officer Longson to pick up Carl l{uehne (R. 1312). 
Cahoon saw Humphreys up Emigration Canyon offering 
to assist in the gun search twice prior to the date he 
and Kuehne found the gun stock. Humphreys was with 
Kuehne on both occasions (R. 1315). Kuehne and Hum-
phreys came up on their own without being asked to 
participate. Cahoon had a conversation with K.uehne 
about the use of the National Guard troops in the search 
for the gun. This conversation took place two or three 
days before Kuehne and Humphreys brought the gun 
stock to the police station (R. 1317). 
Jean Sinclair testified she is the defendant, she 
lives at 2300 South State Street, Salt Lake City, I'tah, 
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and is a nursing home operator in a partnership with 
Ellen RawlinH ~le llenry since 19-!7. She resides at the 
nursing hmue (R. 1328). .Mrs. Rawlins, husband and 
children had lived there until the children grew up and 
the husband died of ~ilicosis. Jean's brother and sister-
in-law crune to live with her in December, 1962 (R. 1329). 
She described the physical plan of the nursing h01ne 
(R. 1330-1337). She 1net Don Foster in the summer of 
1962 at ·LaRae's beauty shop after Foster and LaRae 
returned from Las \.,.egas. She saw Foster three or four 
times in all (R. 13-!1). She was aware LaRae and Foster 
had exchanged rings. She never objected to LaRae 
marrying Foster (R. 1343). She never saw Foster after 
LaRa.e moved out of the shop on October 6th. Jean went 
to California about September 22nd to ship a horse to 
Hawaii, shipping date was scheduled for September 26 
t H. 1345 ). 
She and LaRae discussed LaRae's leaving after 
Jean returned from California in October, both over 
the phone and in the shop. Foster did not bec01ne a sub-
ject of the conversation ( R. 1350). LaRae licensed the 
shop for 1963 after she had moved out (R. 1350). LaRae 
was brought to the rest home by Jean's partner Ellen. 
'Yhen the shop was set up Jean and Ellen furnished 
the room and utilities, LaRae the equipment (R. 1351-2). 
La.Rae did the patients' hair and had her own business 
the balance of the time ( R. 1352). LaRae never stayed 
there at nights (R. 1353). LaRae went with other men 
many times. Two of these, Peay and Graven, had con-
templated marriage with LaRae (R. 1355). Jean had 
a disagreement with LaRae about the child Cheryl Ann 
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ignoring LaRae and transferring her affection to Jean 
and Ellen (R. 1356-7). She admitted writing the note, 
Exhibit 30, in January or February, 1961, long before 
LaRae met Don Foster (R. 1358). LaRae went with 
many men but with Peay, Craven, Berry and Foster 
more than the others. Jean never had any animosity 
or resentment for these four men (R. 1360). There was 
a conve,rsation with Vaughn Humphreys in Ellen's pres-
ence about possible adoption of Cheryl Ann. The subject 
of adoption was brought up by Humphreys ( R. 13G2). 
Humphreys carried a gun and on one occasion wanted to 
lie in wait to shoot someone stealing gas from Jean's 
Cabana truck (R. 1363). Jean, Ellen and Y aughn had 
a discussion regarding Danites and the book "The 
Twenty-Seventh Wife" but neither castration nor harm 
to Foster were mentioned (R. 1365). Jean never men-
tioned Danites to Carl Kuehne (R. 1365). 
Vaughn had wanted to go with LaRae Peterson. 
Jean told him he was wasting his time, LaRae was too 
expensive. Vaughn often complained with respect to 
L,aRae - "Foster is getting it and I'm not" (R. 1368). 
Jean and Vaughn had an argument on a hunting trip 
in late November over Vaughn's vulgar language. Jean 
told him to walk home and called him stupid. Vaughn 
rode home with Jean and didn't come around again 
until Christmas when Bill Rawlins was there (R. 1371). 
She denied any conversation with Kuehne regarding a 
jacket of Vaughn's (R. 1371). She had a phone conversa-
tion with Vaughn regarding his spreading rumors that 
she was a Lesbian. Vaughn denied he had done this (R. 
1373). Vaughn left his jacket in the truck on the last 
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dPt'l' hunt and never <·anw around for it nor did he pick 
it up at Chri~trwtH when II(• <'aiiiP to see Bill Hawlins 
(R. 1373). .I P.an denied l'VPI' having 1nentioned hann 
to Uon Foster to Pither Kuehne or lfumphreys (R. 137G) . 
. Jenn nwt Kuehne in October, 1960 on a deer hunt with 
\'nug-hn. He was around <><'<·asional]~· in 1961 and kept 
\'Pui::-;on in J Pan 'H loekPr that fall. He came around 
l'n·quPntly ~darting in August or September of 1962. 
Kuehne rwvPr mentioned his prison record to Jean until 
~on•mber of 196:2 (H. 1378) wJwn he was angry at his 
~t1•p son for ''messing up my pardon." He threatened 
to kill the hoy (R. 1379). She denied that she ever 
di~(~ussed Foster with l{uehne, that she ever offered 
ht> or any person money to kill or harn1 anybody (R. 
l380). ~he never discussed LaR.ae Peterson or Cheryl 
.\nn with Kuehne (R. 1380), nor had she been to Kearns, 
the Turner house or the Susan Kay Arms with Kuehne. 
LaHaP'H house in ICearns is green or grey (R. 1381) . 
. lean ha~ ll<'n'r ridden past Foster's mother's house with 
Kuehne. She has been to the Susan Kay apartments 
twice - once during the preliminary hearing and once 
with the jury during this trial (R. 1383). She usua!ly 
\H'ar~ jeans or slacks and boots or oxfords around the 
rt>~t home. Ellen gave her the iaeket, Exhibit 44 for 
ht•r birthday. She wears it to horse shows, auctions, 
and Spur meetings (R. 1386). She has bought mens 
:->nit:-; for patients but has never owned one. She bought 
two ~nit~ for patients in June on Main Street below 
Third South (R. 1387). Kuehne always had a beard 
during her acquaintance with him. She went to a pawn 
:->hop with Kuehne to buy a hunting knife when they 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were In town for leather. This wa~ in K ovember (H. 
1389). She denied having l(uelme buy a shot gun or 
shells (R. 1390). She has several guns at home including 
a 12-gauge shot gun owned by Billy Rawlins. Also man~· 
types of ammunition (R. 1391). 
She paid Kuehne $28.00, Exhibit No 33, for leather 
work on the 3rd day of January and wrote the check 
sitting on the couch in Kuehne's apartment. She did 
not see Kuehne on the 4th of January, the day Billy 
Rawlins was hurt (R. 1394). Jean wrote the check, 
Exhibit No. 33, on the couch in Kuehne's apartment 
on January 3rd (R. 1428). The check Exhibit No. 37 is 
a check with a higher serial number and an earlier date 
(R. 1428). She did sign chec$:s for the use of the rest 
home and she, Ellen or J oane would complete them. 
In each of six ( 6) pairs of checks in evidence the date did 
not necessarily correspond with the serial number and 
time of delivery (R. 1429). Jean's back was injured in 
July, 1946. She had two operations on the lower back. 
She was paralyzed from the hips down for a time and 
then used two canes. After the second operation she 
could walk with the canes (R. 1431). She had dates with 
one man .after her injury. She went to a driving range 
with him but after one swing was unable to continue. 
She also went bowling once in 1947 but was unable to 
continue (R. 1432). She tried bowling again in June, 
1962 but was unable to cmnp1ete a line (R. 1433). She 
rides horses but c.annot 1nount without assistance. She 
has tried to run but can't (R. 1433). She can walk up 
stairs but cannot run (R. 1434). She is 5' 3-¥2" with her 
shoes on. She has been losing weight since 1961. Prob-
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ahly weighs about 130 lbs. (R. 1433 ). ~he lost weight 
IIIO~t rapidly in OdobPr, 1961 anu ~larch, 19()2 while 
lun·ing dental trouble (R. 1079). 
~he had a conversation with Htmlphreys in July, 
Hili~ regarding police officers and adoption of Cheryl 
Ann. Vaughn started the conversation and both the 
police and adoption ideas were his (R. 1437). She did 
not see Kuehne on January 4th. She was first aware 
of Thayle Olsen and Ellen hiring a detective on January 
i)th when they told her (R. 1438). On January 4th she 
went to the Lunt Motel to see Bill Rawlins between 5 :30 
and 6:00 p.m. (R. 1438). She went in the Roadmaster 
Buick, talked to Billy and his wife and saw his child. 
8he was there 20 to 30 minutes and returned to the 
re~t home to get epsom salts to soa:k Bill's broken finger. 
~lw left the epsmn salts on the door step when Bill 
and his wife wPre out and returned to the rest home (R. 
1439). She arrived hon1e while ~Etch 1\tfiller was on 
TY, ate pizza, worked on the books and watched rrv. 
Her brother and sister-in-law were there. Her brother 
went to bed shortly after TV went off. She and Mildred 
fed the dogs and put out the patient pills. Mildred went 
to bed about 2:30 a.m. (R. 1441) January 5th. She saw 
Reva start down the stairs from the nursing home proper 
around 10:00 o'clock. She received a call from her book-
keeper Bessie Anderson after 10:00 o'clock (R. 1441). 
There are four telephones in the rest home. 
Jean called Ellen at the bowling alley regarding the 
injury to Billy about 9:30 (R. 1442). 'That night Jean 
was wearing western riding pants, a light green shirt 
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and light jacket. She owns a blue s:ki parka which Hhl· 
had worn in Sandy .and on deer hunts with Carl K.uelme 
and Vaughn Humphreys (R. 1444). She owns a full 
length light tan leather coat but no cloth trench coat. 
She took cleaning to :M~urray January 5th about 10:30 to 
11:00 o'clock. 'The cleaning belonged to both she and 
the patients and included a trench coat (R. 1444). The 
coat is probably still at the rest home (R. 1445). She 
has ne~ver fired a shot gun ( R. 1446). She did not shoot 
Foster nor conspire with Kuehne to shoot :B'oster (R. 
1446). 
On cross examination she testified she changed her 
name in 1959 in the Third District Court. She is J5 
years old, has worn her hair short for many years. She 
wears both shirts and slacks, and dresses. Dresses when 
out or working away from the rest home (R. 1447). She 
has known Humphreys for 15 years along with Ellen's 
boys and has had problems with Vaughn and his vulgar 
mouth (R. 1449-51). Vaughn wanted LaRae and other 
girls (R. 1452). Jean went to California around Sep-
tember 22, 1962 to deliver a horse (R. 1455). She stopped 
in Las Vegas at a motel, paid cash, and the next day 
drove to the Pales Verdes hills, stabled the horse and 
she stayed in Hollywood. She contacted Matson Lines 
to arrange shipment (R. 1455 ). "'Tent to her brother'~ 
in Chula Vista, California, brought her brother and 
brother's horse back to Salt Lake (R. 1456). She knows 
Thayle Olsen and Thayle was with her when she bought 
two (2) suits for patients at a sale. She kept one suit 
and returned the other. She paid cash. She bought the 
suits because the patients were small and needed short 
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ja1·k\'t:-'. ShP trit>d on the jaC'kets. I )op;-;n't renH·mher about 
tht• pant. rrhay}p gave infonnation for delivPry-Exhibit 
;,;; (H. l·Hi-l). XPither the coat nor pant~ were altered 
to fit her (R. 1465). She has only been accused of being 
a I. .. esbian in this court room (R. 1466). \Yhen asked as 
to "houw~Pxual ad~ on LaHae Peterson or she witl1 
you" ~he claimPd privilege. Slw \nl~ never at the Susan 
Kay Arms prior to her arrest (R. 1465). She admitted 
l·>dtihit :m wa~ her hand \\Titing. She had written the 
note after a heated discussion with LaR.ae about Cheryl 
Ann·~ neglect and transfer of affection. Jean clai1ned 
privilege under the 5th amendment to three questions 
regarding the note (Exhibit 30) (R. 1472). The note 
was written prior to when L.aRae met Foster (R. 1473). 
LaRae was going with Cravens at the time of the note. 
She had advised LaRae to 1narry Craven to nlake a honw 
for Cheryl Ann (R. 1474). 
Jean was at Kuehne's on December 28th with the 
witne~s \Yetzel. She brought a fifth of Irish whiskey 
for LaRae Kuehne. Jean had a sip of wine. She left 
the bottle with Kuehne for his wife (R. 1478). She went 
to sleep on the eouch and left at 7:00a.m. the next morn-
ing (R. 1479). Jean and I(uehne went hunting on De-
cember 30th. She saw him at the rest home on New· 
Year·~ En' with three (3) other people (R. 1480), and 
tli(l not spe him again until January 3rd (R. 1481). She 
explained check procedure on the rest home accounts 
(R. 1482-86). Vaughn Humphreys was having dinner 
with Bill Rawlins and his wife when Jean left the epsom 
salts (R. 1491). Jean was not .aware prior to January 
:lth that Thayle Olsen had hired a detective (R. 1494). 
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She has passed Foster's 1nother's place on her way to 
J oane's but doesn't know what day. She did not drive 
back and forth (R. 1498). She has not been able to move 
faster than a walk since 1946 and has to glance down 
when walking. She swims, has not golfed but went to a 
driving range when she took one swing and quit (R. 
1500). She :knows Colonel Olson, drill master of the 
Silver Spurs. She doesn't saddle her own horse. She 
tries to do the drills (R. 1505) but has dropped out of 
several drills (R. 1507). She wrote a check for the horse's 
board in California on September 29, 1962. The check, 
Exhib~t No. 57, \Vas the board for 5 da~·s (H. 1512). 
Jean explained the narcotic procedure at the rest home 
(R. 1517-24). She saw Reva Nelson coming down the 
stairs at 10:00 o'clock on January 4th (R. 1525). She 
saw Thelma Eatchell when she was fixing Austin's 1 :00 
o'clock shot. She did not change clothes on the night 
of January 4th or early morning of the 5th other than 
shoes (R. 1536). Don Foster was not mentioned while 
she was on the polygraph at the police station (R. 1542). 
At .a recess counsel made Motion for a mistrial on 
the basis of a magazine article in Startling Detective dis-
tributed in the Salt Lake area during the trial although 
it was a July issue. (See R. 1546 et seq) 
She fell in the bathtub while in iail and injured her 
back (R. 1584). The stairs from the rest home to the 
basement living quarters are so set up that you can see 
progressively larger portions of the hall with each step 
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taken down tltP stain; (It l;>nt). You can't see into the 
rest home living romn from the hallway (R. 1566). 
Morgan l •aeP testified he :knows Don Foster, LaHaP 
Pl'tPr~on and ,Jean Sinel.air. He has seen fringed leather 
jackets similar to Jean'H, Exhibit -1--1-, at the Susan ICay 
Arms on otiH•r women. 
\Yilliant \Vyler testified he is a loan officer at 
Zion~ Savings & Loan, Brig. Gen. USNG retired, has 
known Jean since 19-!-! or 1945. H(:•r reputation in the 
community as to being peaceable is good. 
Buell G. Bryan identified shot gun Exhibit D-59 and 
:-;hot gun shell, Exhibit D-60, frmn the rest home and 
demonstrated the gun could be loaded and has a firing 
pin. 
Dewey Fillis, police officer, testified he is captain in 
(·harge of detectives. \.,..aughn Humphreys approached 
him \Yednseday, January 9th at a bowling alley with 
regard to Jean Sinclair and informed him Jean had 
approached Humphreys and Kuehne about the Foster-
Peterson relationship. Hmnphreys was present during 
Kuehne interrogation and may have entered into the 
inkrrogation (R. 1581). Fillis had a conversation with 
Kuehne about a pardon for a former felony (R. 1583). 
Kuehne told Fillis he had purchased the shot gun, had 
been three (3) places with Sinclair to determine best 
place to shoot Foster - had shown her how to load the 
gl.m- had sawed off the gun- had emptied the shells, 
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placed under arrest (R. 1585-86). \Vhen <-ruestioned why 
he had not placed Kuehne under arrest, an objection 
was sustained by the Court (R. 1585). No complaint was 
ever filed against l{uehne. 
Richard C. Dibblee testified he \vas chief criminal 
deputy of Salt Lake County Attorney's office in charge 
of the Sinclair case through preliminary hearing. He 
authorized the complaint signed against l\iiss Sinclair. 
He knew of Kuehne's statement - that K~uehne hau 
gone various places to determine the best place to shoot 
Foster. He had purchased the gun - sawed it off -
taken the loads out of 24 shells prior to the killing -
showed Jean how to load the gun and later disposed of 
the gun and shells (R. 1591). When asked why he didn't 
have a complaint signed against Kuehne, the Court sus-
tained the District Attorney's objection as being im-
material (R. 1592). 
Bessie Anderson testified she is an auditor for the 
State Tax Commission and has iknown Jean since 1950. 
She had handled the nursing home taxes for the past 
three years (R. 1592). On January 4th at about 10.30 
she called Jean at the nursing home and had a discussion 
with her with regard to quarterly taxes (R. 1594). The 
business had to do with returns due January 31st (R. 
1595). She places the time by the 10:00 o'clock news on 
January 4th (R. 1596) and the date by dismantling of 
her Christmas tree. She frequently called Jean at night 
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.Madi~on ll. Thomas is a plly~it·ian ~peeializing in 
neurology and ha~ been ePrtified in his specialty since 
1949; is a member of the staff of the LDS 1-Iospital 
tUld is comm.ltant to thP l'tah State llospital and 'Yyo-
ming ~tatt' Hospital (H. 139G). lie examined Jean Sin-
dail' on l~\·hntary 13th and reviewed the hospital records 
relative to two (~) spinal surgeries in 1946 (H. 1397). 
~he Ita~ impainnent of lwr lower extre1nities and 
~Pnsory impairment of the buttocks and saddle area (H. 
t:)!tS). ~ht• ha~ an impaired walk. No running could be 
lllit·ited. He would not expect a person in her condition 
to be able to run over an area without a grotesque or 
~toopt>tl appearance (R. 14023). He talked with Dr. 
~tPwart \Y right who had done one of the spinal opera-
tions on Jean Sinclair. It would seem unlikely for her 
to be able to run in the usual fashion, but not impossible 
to run (R. 1-11-l-). The ankle jerk is entirely laclring in 
the left ankle and just perceptible in the right (R. 1417) . 
. \ person under stress with a neurological disability will 
at tempt things beyond what he has learned is his limit 
and will stu1nble or fall and his performance may be 
worse instead of better. It is In ore likely that a person 
with a neurological disability could 1nove faster over 
nn area in which they could see where they were putting 
their feet than over a dark area (R. 1419). 
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REBUTTAL 
La Von Turner testified she is Don :B--,oster'~ mother 
and lives at 47 'Vest Sunset Avenue which is lwt\\'een 
Main Street and West Temple. On Father's Day, 1!)():2, 
she had her son Don, LaRae Peterson and Cheryl Ann 
Peterson to dinner. She saw a blue and white station 
wagon driving by the house a couple of times very 
slowly. (R. 1605). Her hmne is about one and one-half 
blocks west of Jean's nursing home and several blocks 
south (R. 1604). She doesn't know whether the Buick 
was a Roadmaster, Century or Super (R. 1604). She 
identified Exhibit No. 50, the defendant'~ station wagon 
as the car she saw but said the top ·was white and the 
bottom was blue. The station wagon in the exhibit is 
blue over white (R. 1605). 
Mel Humphreys testified he lives at 2164 South 4th 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah and is Justice of the Peace. 
He is the father of \T aughn Humphreys. One of his two 
(2) automobiles is a 1954 Chevrolet sedan with a light 
blue body and an off-white top bearing 1963 rtah license 
number DD 9207 (R. 1607). No one but he ever drives 
the automobile. His son \' aughn has a 1955 Chevrolet 
sedan with the same colors (R. 1610). 
Floyd Bertleson testified he was with John Storey 
and two (2) girls at the Susan Kay apartments when 
they heard a shot and a scream. After seeing Foster 
was shot he went to his own car, got a derringer and went 
back to the Foster car. He did not receive a gun from 
LaRae Peterson, nor was he between the chain link fence 
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and the car whilP he had his gun. (Tlw dPrringer w.as not 
offered in t•vidPne<•.) 
Vidor L. Olsen i~ an ex-cavalry man retireu fr01n 
the army. He is drill master for the Silver Spurs riding 
organization. Jean Sinclair belonged to the Silver Spurs. 
liP dP~·wrilwd the exercises and drills the Silver Spurs 
went through and said Jean participated (R. 1623-24). 
lie has never ~wen Jean 1nount or dis1nount from a horse 
(R. 1628). 
LaRae Kuehne, previously sworn, testified in re-
huttal and ~tated, over objection, that Mildred Sinclair 
hnd told he-r aftPr the killin,v; ··~·ou know, LaRae, even 
if sis wasn't there that night :\Iond and I would say 
she was'' (R. 1633). The \vitness can't re1ne1nber her 
own part of the conversation but could remen1ber what 
~[ildred said .. b~ause I went hon1e and \\Tote it down" 
(R. 1635 ). 
Bruno F. Romano, private detective, testified that 
Thayle Olsen hired him to foUow Don Foster. The Court, 
over objection, allowed Rmnano to repeat the substances 
of the conversations with Thayle Olsen (R. 1637 -38). 
Yaughn Humphreys, recalled, testified he had seen 
Jean get on and off a horse at various times (R. 1642). 
That he has a fawn colored three-quarter length trench 
coat (R. 1647). 
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Beth Foster testified regarding telephone conver:-;a-
tions with ·Thayle Olsen relative to Foster and LaRaP 
Peterson (R. 1649-50). 1\Irs. Foster and her husband 
had never made plans to finish the divorce and she was 
still keeping books for Foster at the time of his death 
(R. 1652). 
Reva Nelson testified that she worked at Jean's rest 
home and knows both J e.an and Ellen. She worked 
January 4th until 10 :00 p.m. when Thelma Ea tchell came 
on to relieve her (R. 1655). At about 8 :20 p.m. she saw 
M:ildred Sinclair and Jean in the kitchen. Mildred wm; 
warming pizz.a for Jean. Reva came down stairs again 
at 10 :10, she got her coat and went home . She did not 
see anyone hut could hear people talking in the living 
room (R. 1658). She said you can't see 1nuch of the 
hall from the top of the stair hut can see a little more 
with e.ach step you take down. 
Tim Monroe, News Eidtor for I<:CPX-TV, showed 
moving picture films, Exhibit Nos. 62 and 63, of the de-
fendant walking from the jail to the courthouse on 
January 21, 196.3, and from the courthouse to the jail 
April 15, 1963. 
Kermit DuBois testified he is a clothing salesman at 
English Tailors. He saw J e.an Sinclair last June or 
July in the Salt Lake City store with another lady. Jean 
was dressed in riding trousers and perhaps a iacket. 
She bought two (2) suits. He identified Exhibit Nos. 
53 and 54 as s.ales slips for the purchases. He thought 
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:;lw was a man (H. lli'-1::). He te~tified that he fitted 
both suits on lwr but admitted that one had been re-
turned and when the District Attorney had her try 
the suit coat on admitted it did not fit. (The suit coat 
was not admitted in evidence.) 
LaRue Peter~on t·alled in rebuttal, said she did not 
give anyone a pistol at the scene of the shooting on 
January 5th. rrhe only thing she picked up was Foster's 
keys (R. 1697). Pearl .l\faxfield picked up Don's cigar-
PUPs (R. 1696). Foster had many guns in the apartment. 
liP earried a 38-revolver in hiH brief case which was 
nol11Ullly in the car. 
Thelma Eatchell knows Jean Sinclair; has worked 
at thP n'st honw frmn J ul~,, 1961 to January, 1963 when 
8lw quit (R. 1700). On January 4, 1963, she came to 
work at 10 :00 p.m. and relieved Reva Nelson. Narcotic 
shots werP given to patients on order left on the patient 
chart and she recorded the day and the time the shots 
were given. The narcotic chart was in the hall of the 
living quarters by the sterilizer (R. 1705 ). In preparing 
a ~hot the syringe had to be boiled for 3 minutes and 
then allowed to cool ( R. 1707). She heard voices in the 
living room when she prepared a shot shortly after 10:00 
p.m. on January -1-th but didn't recognize them (R. 1710). 
At .about twenty (20) minutes to 12, January 4th, she 
called down the dumbwaiter for ~Iildred three (3) times 
hut got no answer (R. 1750). She talked to Lamond 
Sinclair when ~he came on at 10 :00 p.m. She saw Jean's 
le~~ and feet at the bottom of the stairs at about 1 :20 
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a.m., January 5th when she went down to prepare a shot 
of Demerol for patient Harris. After she had given the 
shot to Harris she came down the stairs again and 
talked to Jean. She said Jean had changed clothes. 
After she talked to Jean she proceeded to get out the 
D·emerol for May Austin's 1:00 a.m. shot (R. 1722). 
After she gave the second shot she came down and made 
the entrance on the narotic sheet at 1:30 a.m. (R. 1724). 
The nursing notes, Exhibit D-67, show May Austin was 
given her shot before Harris was given his. The Austin 
shot is charted at 1 :00 a.m. Both shots were given 
after she saw Jean's legs at the foot of the stairs (H. 
1743). You can't see the kitchen door from the top of 
the stair but can see a little more of the hall each time 
you take a step down (R. 144). When Thelma saw Jean's 
legs Jean was wearing blue levis and cowboy boot~. 
Thelma testified the times on the nursing charts are 
wrong but admits they are her hand writing. She can't 
recollect what she did nor to whom she gave shots on 
shifts either prior to January 4th or shifts subsequent 
to January 4th or 5th (R. 1749-50). 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE 
STATE'S CASE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT CARL KUEHNE WAS AN ACCOMPLICE AS 
A ~lATTER OF LAW. 
The defendant moved to dismiss at the end of the 
~tatP•s rase on the grounds that Carl Kuehne was an 
areomplrice as a Inatter of la'v and that his testimony 
had not been corroborated (R. 1016, et seq). The de-
fendant further moved for a directed verdict when both 
parties had rested on the same reasons and grounds 
and thereafter requested that the Court instruct the 
jury Umt Carl Kuehne was an accomplice as a matter 
of law. The Court denied both motions and thereafter 
denied a similar motion as one of the bases for defend-
ant'~ motion for a new trial. 
These poinb .are so interrelated that they are argued 
under one heading. 
76-1--1-J., Vtah Code Annotated 1953 defines pnn-
cipals, has the effect of making aiders and abettors 
principals and does away ·with accessories before the fact. 
The Code further obviates the necessity of persons being 
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at the scene of the crin1e to 1na:ke one an aider and 
abettor. The statute reads as follo\vs: 
·• All persons concerned in the commission of 
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether 
they directly corn1nit the act constituting the 
offense or aid and abet in its commission or, not 
being present, have advised and encouraged its 
commission, and all persons counseling, advising 
or encouraging children under the age of four-
teen years, lunatics or idiots to coimnit any crime, 
and all persons who by fraud, contrivance or 
force occasion the drunkenness of another for 
the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, 
or who by threats, 1nenaces, command or coercion 
compel another to commit any crime, are prin-
cipals in any crime so committed." 
77-31-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides that a defendant 
cannot he convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of 
an accomplice. See Point IV citing cases. Kuehne's own 
evidence makes him an aider and abettor and therefore 
an accomplice. The question of who is an accomplice 
is a question of law for the Court. 
"The question of who is an accomplice within 
the rule requiring corroboration of their testi-
mony is a question of law for the Court \Yhere the 
facts as to witnesses' participation are clear and 
undisputed and one of fact for the jury where 
such facts are subject to different inferences." 
Stat.e v. Ripley, 189 Tenn. 681, 227 S\V 2d 26, 
19 A.L.R. 1347 with Ann. 
"Where the facts are in a dispute or where 
the acts and conduct of the witness are admitted, 
it be·comes a question of lavY for the Court to say 
whether those acts and fact make the witness an 
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lH'<'ollt pli<·e.'' 19 ~ \. L.R. 1 ;~;>;> <'iting ea~P~. L~tah 
u.ppnlvp:-; the above. ~PP Slate r. Corales, I± 
Utah 9-1-1, :217 P. :.W:3; State ~-. 8u1t1rr.-,·, 97 L:tah 
.-l-W, 90 1'. :27:3. 
In the instant <·a:-;e there is no conflict in what the 
ad~ done hy K.uehne were and they are subject to only 
one inferencP, that he aided and assisted in preparation 
for the killing of Don Foster. According to his testimony, 
he went three (3) different places with the defendant 
to advise her of the best place to shoot Foste-r (R. 539-
-10--11, 603, ti:2-1-, ()1-1-75-76). He purchased a gun and 
shell:-; at her request. Doing so, he gave a false name 
and address because "he knew what she was going to use 
the gun l'or" (R. 683). At the tin1e he bought the gun 
he knew the defendant already had a shot gun (R. 684). 
He knew it was her "avowed purpose to :kill Don Foster" 
(H. 716). He sawed off the gun at her request on the 
night of January ±th (R. 626). He en1ptied :24 of the 
~.) ~hells before the shooting in preparation to disp<>se of 
them (R. ti:2S-:29). He shaved off his beard because he 
thought the cops would be after her and get hi1n for the 
killing. He procured an alibi witness because she was 
going to shoot Foster on Dece1nber 28th. He expressed 
no ~urprise when she arrived at his home after the shoot-
ing and ordered hiin to dispose of the gun and shells 
because he was an accomplice before and after the fact. 
He admittedly knew the object of each step of the prepar-
ation. He did not atten1pt to withdraw from the scheme 
or plan a:3 late as January 4th ·when she left his apart-
nwnt to "kill n1yself a son-of-a-bitch." 
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As set forth above, 76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953 makes aiders 
and abettors principals and obviates the necessity of 
presence .at the crime. Aiding and abetting "means to 
assist the perpetrator of the crime." U.S. v. vVi1liams, 
71 S. Ct. 59·5, 341 U.S. 58, 95 L. Ed. ------· 
Aiding and abetting and concealing are not mere 
terms for presupposing the e~istence of an argument 
but such terms have a broader application making a de-
fendant a principal \vhen he consciously shares in a 
criminal act regardless of existence of a conspiracy. Per-
aria v. U.S., 74 S. Ct. 358, 347 U.S. 1, 98 L. Ed. ------· 
To instigate means to aid, promote, or encourage 
commission of an offense and one of its synonyms is abet. 
Nye & Nissen v. U.S., 168 F. 2d 846, Aff. 698 S. Ct. 766, 
336 U.S. 613. A person aiding and abetting in commis-
sion of a crime can be convicted .as principal under stat-
ute without regard to conspiracy or concert of action. 
Nye & Nissen v. U.S., supra. A defendant aids or abets 
a person in committing an unlawful .act so as to be guilty 
as a principal by aiding such person by acts or encour-
aging such person by words with knowledge of the 
wrongful purpose of such person. People v. LaGrant 
(Cal.), 172 P. 2d 554). See also People v. Cowan, 101 
P. 2d 125; People v. Green (Wash.), 221 P. 2d 127. One 
aiding in or ·abetting by word or deed preparation for 
or encouraging an unlawful act resulting in another's 
death, is as guilty as the person committing the crime. 
Cline v. State, 148 S. 172, 25 Ala. App. 143. Criminal 
responsibility as at common law extends to any person 
who assists in the commission of the offense, counsels or 
48 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pro(·un•s in the committing or assisb in the conunission 
of tht- offense . . Ar/kins u. CunuJioJIIn'alth, 9 ~E 2d 349, 
t::t .\. L.R. 131:2. 
'rhe following cases do not re<1uire presence .at the 
<'riliH'. Crow v. State, 79 SW 2d 75, 190 Ark. :222, a nlur-
dt>r <'H.SP. Not present but a principal. People v. Wil-
liams, :2-lS P. l07S, a California case. Not present but 
nid~r .and abettor. State v. Robinett, 279 S\V 697 (Tex.), 
homici<lt> Pncouraged by acts or deeds advising and coun-
~eling though not at scene. State c. Allison, 156 SE 54 7, 
~tlO XC 190. Defendant gave gun to parmnour that he 
might escape. A sheriff was killed in the escape. She 
was guilty as an accessory though not present. State c. 
Smith, :281 SW 285. 
There are numerous holdings that a single act prior 
to a erime and a-way from the place of comn1ission are 
~nfficient to constitute one an accomplice or principal. 
~\ person made a key for principals in a theft from a 
railroad car; held guilty as an accon1plice. Bass v. State, 
ti~ s'v 2d 127. 
~[iss Sinclair took the stand and denied any criminal 
connection with Kuehne. 
"The fact that the defendant takes the stand 
and denies any connection with the erime or with 
the witness does not, however, create a disputed 
fact set up within the rule so as to require sub-
mission of the question to the jury as the evidence 
in regard to the witnesses' connection with the 
crime i~ otherwise uncontested." Carter v. State 
(Okla.), :28 P.2d 581, Ann. at 19 .A.L.R. 1354. 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no conflict as to Kuelme's participation 
as an aider and abettor other than the defendant's denial 
of her connection with Kuehne and his staten1ent that hP 
didn't think she was going to do it, as she had threatened 
before. 
It is pointed out that at the end of the State's ea~c· 
when the Motion to Dismiss was made there was no con-
flict whatsoever. 
It was error to submit the question of law to the 
jury. It should have been determined as a matter of 
law and either defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
granted or the question of corroborating evidence should 
have been submitted to the jury under proper instruc-
tions as stated in Carter v. State, supra, Ann. 19 A.L.R. 
2d at page 135-t. 
"Submitting the question of accomplicity to 
a jury may confuse them. They might erroneously 
conclude that an accomplice in fact is not an ac-
complice and return a verdict of guilty without 
sufficient corroboration, which they might not 
have done if they had understood clearly that the 
witness was as a matter of law an accomplice and 
that corro1boration was necessary." 
McKinney v. State, C.C.A. Okla., 201 P. 673, is a 
very clearly reasoned case with regard to instructions 
on accomplices. The Court states at page 676: 
"Where the evidence showing that persons 
are accomplices is undisputed, the issue is one of 
law, and not of fact" citing Cudjoe v. St.ate, 12 
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Tlw Court further ~tatPs at pagP (i77: 
.. r,or tllP error of the Court in failing to 
in~t rud the jury, a~ a nmtter of law, that Tidwell 
was an ae<'omplice, and for failing to give appro-
priatt· instructions a~ to whPther ~lrs. Gregory 
\Hts an (H'l'Onlpli<'P, this case is reversed and re-
manded." 
It is intPrPsting to note that 1\Irs. Gregory's only 
participation in tlw crime \\·as furnishing one of the 
prineipab w;th l'ood while he was waiting for a con-
n•nient tillll' to commit the robbery charged. The only 
reason the Court held that there was a question of fact 
regarding :Mrs. Gregory's accomplicity was due to a 
statute, Revised Laws of Oklahoma 2099, creating a 
presmnption that she was acting under duress on the 
part of her husband. See also Winfield &. State, 44 Texas 
Criminal -!7."i, 7:2 S\Y 182: 
"\YhPre the undisputed evidence indicates 
that the witnt-ss is an accomplice, the trial Court 
has a right to charge the jury that the \Vitness 
is an a(·complirP. Such charge is not on the weight 
of the evidence nor erroneous, and renders un-
neces~ary any charge defining the law of accom-
plirity." 
The Court's instructions No. 9 and 10 n1ade this 
ronfusion eYen more likely. See Point VII, this brief. 
This is especially true in a case such as that on an appeal 
where the entire fourteen days of testimony were in-
fected with the innuendo of a homosexual relationship 
between the defendant and another witness, and the de-
fendant was, in fact, being tried on a question of homo-
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sexuality rather than homicide. Cases in our State, with-
out exception, hold that corroboration of an accomplice':-; 
testimony is necessary, and that evidence showing motive 
or to cast grave suspicion on the defendant are not suffi-
cient to corroborate. See Point IV. 
The State's contention has been that Carl Kuelme 
\Yas not an accomplice because he had no crin1inal intent, 
or in the alternative, that he didn't think that Jean Sin-
clair was going to kill Foster. The question of criminal 
intent is clear arising from his guilty knowledge of the 
purpose for which the gun was purchased, for which it 
was sawed off, why the shells were unloaded, that "she 
was going to kill herself a son-of-a-bitch," and that ''son-
of-a-bitch" was Don Foster. 
The question of intent and criminal intent is dis-
cussed fully in Point VII. The intent is presumed. See 
State v. Owen, 119 Ore. 15, 244 P. 560; Commonwealth v. 
Lowry, 374 P. 594, 98 At. 2d 733, Certiorari Denied, 347 
U.S. 914, 98 L. Ed. 1017, 74 S. Ct. 479. It is immaterial 
whether the aider and abettor has any direct or personal 
interest in the results of the crime or whether he will 
gain in any way thereby. U.S. v. Mass, 122 Fed. Supp. 
523, reversed on other grounds. Cir. 3rd, 220 F. 2d 166. 
If one person assisted another in doing a criminal 
act, it is presumed he shared the intent with which the 
person was doing the act. Wharton's Cri1ninal Evidence, 
12th Ed., Vol. 1, page 246. If a person advising or 
c.ounseling the crime changes his mind he is still liable 
as an accessory if he does not inform the principal of 
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hi~ changed desires. Stall' r. ~lllen, -l-7 Conn. 121, \Yhar-
ton·~ C.L. & P .. 12th Ed. ~:3D. 
"In order to be an aeet>ssory before the fact 
it i:-; IIP<'P~~a rY that the actor :know that he is 
taking a step. to prmnote the co1nn1ission of a 
crimP. l t i~ not necessary that the accomplice be-
fore the t'ad have full knowledge of all the details 
of tlw eriminal plan or the identity of all persons 
partieipating therein. It is not necessary that the 
defendant should have originated the design of 
committing the offense if the principal had pre-
viou~ly formed the design, and the alleged accom-
plice encouraged him to carry it out by falsehood 
or otherwise, he is guilty as an accessory before 
the fact." \Vharton's 12th Ed., citing K eeleher v. 
State, 10 Smedes & ~1 (Mis~.) 192. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE CARL 
KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY. 
The law is well settled in this State, both by statute 
and <·asP, that the defendant cannot he convicted on 
the testin10ny of an accomplice unless sufficiently cor-
roborated by evidence tending to connect the defendant 
\\ith the crime unaided by any inference from the testi-
mony of the accomplice, and that it is not enough that 
~uch testimony show motive or possible motive or cast 
grave suspicion on the accused. 77-31-18, U.C.A. 1953; 
State t:. Iru·in, 101 rtah 365, 120 P. 2d 285; State v. 
Br!lener, lOG l-;-tah 49, 14 P. 2d 302; State ~-. So-nwrs, 
97 l·tah 13:2, SO P. :2d :273; State r. Gardner, 27 P. 2d 51, 
eiting some thirty trtah cases. 
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The evidence must be to some 1naterial matter or 
fact which is inconsistent with innocence of the de-
fendant ... the evidence 1nust do 1nore than (•reate a 
suspicion of the defendant's guilt, State v. Laris, 78 l!tall 
183, 2 P. 2c1283, and it is not enough to establish a motiYP 
merely, Goodwin v. CommonweaUh, 256 Ky. 1, 73 S\V 
2d 567, unless there is corroborating evidence of a ma-
terial fact tending to connect the defendant with tlw 
commission of the crime the Court should direct a ver-
dict. People v. Veits, 79 Cal. App. 576, 250 P. 588; State 
v. ArhanNc, 196 Iowa 223, 194 NW 209, both cited in 
Stat,e v. Somers, supra. The evidence is not corrobora-
tive if it needs interpretation and directon from the testi-
Inony of the accused. People v. Thurmond (Cal.), 338 P. 
2d 473. 
A careful scrutiny of the extensive record in the case 
on appeal shows it to be completely devoid of evidence 
to connect Jean Sinclair with the killing of Don Foster. 
There is no single fact or group of facts that connect 
her to the crin1e. 
The State contended on argument of defense coun-
sel's Motion to Dismiss (R. 1025 et seq): 
(a) There are sufficient facts to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Jean Sinclair had a sufficient 
motive to kill Don Foster. 
(b) 1That Vaughn Humphreys' testimony regarding 
a discussion of Danites and a threat of castration to Don 
Foster shows an act calculated to inflict great bodily 
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harm and <·onnpd:-; ,Jpan Sinclair to the <·riine charged 
iudt•pPlHIPnt of K twhne':-; tP~I imony. 
~l') That (lprritadina Umnbee':-; testinwny that :-;he 
~aw tJw <h•I'Pndant walking away fr01n the driveway south 
of the SuS'an Kay Aparbnents smne weeks prior to the 
:-;hooting wlwn combined with .\1 i~~ Hinclair's denial that 
=-ht• had hePn then•, tends to connect her to the crin1e. 
(d) That taking a coat with spots on it to the 
<·leaner~ on ,January 5th tends to connect the defendant 
to tlw criine. On motion for directed verdict the State 
:-;ubmittPd the question to the Court without argun1ent, 
ma!king no additional clailns of corroboration (R. 1851-
;>~). 
Di~wussing these items individually: 
(a) \Yhile there is testilnony aside fron1 that of 
Kuehne showing a concern for LaRae Peterson's child 
due to LaRae's association with the deceased, and there 
are inferenees arising from innuendo of a hmnosexual 
relationship between the defendant and LaRae Peterson 
whieh i~ substantiated only by unwarranted inference 
from refusal to answer questions on the ground of priv-
ilege, there is also similar inference of motive or possible 
motiYe in several other persons: \'"aughn IIu1npherys 
from his desires for LaRae Peterson, Ellen :McHenry in 
her concern for the Peterson child, Thayle Olsen in hir-
ing a detectiYe to follow LaRae Peterson. Possible mo-
tive i~ entirely consistent with innocence and the Ftah 
l'll~t·~ hold without exception that establishment of mo-
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tive is not sufficient to corroborate. State 'L'. Somers, 
supra. 
(b) The State claimed Yaughn IIumphreys testified 
that the defendant propositioned him to disguise aH 
Danites and assist she and Carl ICuehne to castrate 
Foster, and contends this is a threat to Foster which 
tends to eonnect her to the crime. On the interesting 
theory as set out by ~1r. Banks (R. 1025): 
''Here's a place where .Jfr. Hatch and I don't 
agree, but you'll re-call Vaughn :Humphreys' testi-
mony as to his stating that Jean Sinclair con-
tacted him and propositioned him to go along 
with herself and Carl ICuehne and castrate him. 
Now, you n1ight on the surface say that only goes 
to motive. I don't agree with that for this reason. 
It shows an act to inflict great bodily injury upon 
him which is included in murder in the second 
degree. Even though you don't have an intent to 
kill, you have an intent to inflict great bodily in-
jury which may result in death. 
"For instance, supposing you castrated too 
far. Left there. Bleeds to death. Dies of shock. 
That's just an example." 
This is neither the law nor the faet. An examination of 
Humphreys' testin1ony indicates that the conversation 
referred to was not a request to do any affirmative act 
but merely a statement arising fron1 the discussion of 
a book, and even construed at its worst, did not contem-
plate or intend bodily harn1 to Foster but a suggested 
means of frightening him. The applicable conversation 
is set forth at R. 733-34: 
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".\. \Vt>ll, it waH shortly ju~t hPfnre deer season. 
She got me aside one night and she said 'H tnn-
phreys-
(~. \Vas this down at the house again? 
A. Again always in her house. 
Q. \Vas anyone else present~ 
A. Xo. 
Q. \ Yill you tell us what was said '? 
.\. She said she'd been reading a:bout some reli-
gion, Dani tes or Dani tes or something and 
they were smne religion that didn't believe in 
-1 don't know what they didn't believe in, but 
she ~aid they purged the non-believers by cas-
tration. And she s,aid that-she said,· You know, 
it would be a good idea if you and I and Carl 
K~uehne would put some masks on some night 
and play like these Danites and go catch Don 
Foster and pull his pants down and put a knife 
to his testicles and tell him if he didn't leave 
LaRae Peterson alone that he'd lose them.' 
And then she said, • He wouldn't be wanting 
to screw her any more if he thought he was 
going to lose those, would he'' And I said, 
·King, you're nuts.' I said, 'It's utterly ab~ 
surd. I don't want anything to do with it.' It 
sounded too fantastic for me to believe that 
someone would tell me something like that." 
The conversation, if it happened, took place son1e months 
before the crime and the only possibility of connection 
would go to motive as heretofore discussed. 
(c) Gerritadina C01nbee testified to seeing a woman 
whom ~he identified as the defendant walk out of the 
driveway south of the Susan I\.:ay apartment house some 
two to three week8 prior to the killing (R. 903). Her 
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only identification ·was fron1 a right rear view. She ad-
mits she never saw the face, could describe no part of 
the apparel ·but the leather jacket, and only saw the rear 
oblique vie·w for a few steps (R. 921). The State con-
tends that this is sufficient to independently connect 
her to the crime in that vicinity several weeks later, but 
see State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518. This is a bur-
glary case wherein two acc01nplices testified the de-
fendant was with them on the burglary. Fifty-four 
bottles of beer, a number of cans of corn and peas, and 
some jars of fruit were t~ken. The accomplices ~testified 
they hid them in brush near a trail on or near a ranch 
occupied by the defendant. About a "'eek or ten days 
after that, two jars of fruit taken from the cellar were 
found hidden in the brush. About eighteen empty beer 
bottles were found in defendant's house, but it was not 
shown that they were the bottles taken from the cellar. 
A boy about eight years of age testified that he saw one 
of the accomplices and the defendant in the daytimP 
with a horse and buggy drive into the brush, where 
the fruit jars were found, and heard ·what sounded 
like the rattle of bottles in a sack. He did not see 
anything taken in or out of the buggy. The accomplice, 
seeing the boy, told him to get for home, that he 
was snooping around to steal something, and he didn't 
want to catch him there any more. The Court held that 
this was not sufficient corroboration. Also see State r. 
Somers, supra, .an arson case wherein the defendant was 
seen in the company of the accomplice within a half hour 
of the fire and was seen within a block of the fire within 
an hour before the fire. Held insufficient corroboration. 
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PHIJJ!t· v. 1,/il(nllolul, supra, where the defendanl wa:-; 
;-;hown to h.ave ht•en in tlw apartment where the eri1nes 
wen· committt-d many t inw:-; during the period over which 
tlw crinll':-; (ad:-; of pern•rsion under California Penal 
('odt> ~~S(a) wt-n~ alleged to have bePn co1nmitted. IIeld 
insufficient corroboration in spite of contradictory ad-
mi~~ions hy tilt- defendant. 
(d) The State contends the fact that Jean Sinclair 
took certain artiele~ of clothing to the cleaners on J anu-
ar~· rlth conned~ her directly to the crime, and much 
ado i:-; nul.<lP ahout certain grease t-\pots on a trench 
eoat. among the articles taken to the cleaners. 'rithout 
interpretation or direction from the testimony of the ac-
complice, there is nothing to connect either the spots or 
the coat to the crime. In fact, if l{uehne's testimony 
i~ worthy of belief, he didn't know the condition of the 
t•oat when she left his home at 11 :00 p.m. on January 
4th prior to the killing (R. 578-79). He stated at line 26, 
"~he went to the car and got what I later 
ll:'arued "·a~ a white coat, wrapped the gun in it, 
and ~aid slw was going to kill herself a son-of-a-
bitch that night." (Emphasis added) 
A~nin at R. 585, speaking of the coat after defendant's 
return at 1:00 o'clock: 
"l seem to recollect that it was smudged with 
a bit of grease and dust." 
'Yhen asked if he recollected where the grease and dust 
were located, he replied, 
··x ot too well. I'd hate to make a definite 
statement on it" (R. 585). 
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Spots on the coat n1ean nothing without being given di-
rection and interpretation in the testimony of 1\:uelme. 
People v. Thurmond, supra. 
While it is true that witness Harvey saw a person 
running from the scene of the shooting wearing a three-
quarter length, light colored coat ending above or at the 
break of the knees (R. 986), he described the person as 
5'6" to 5'10", a burley man with dark hair, heavy set and 
running very agilely (R. 988), without a limp or de-
formities. ·The defendant is 5'372" with her shoes on, 
weighs 130 pounds, has grayish brown hair and a physi-
cal infirmity in the legs and buttocks. The State made no 
attempt to have Harvey identify Miss Sinclair as the 
person at the scene. 
Witness Williarns also testified to seeing in a rear 
view mirror a man in a light short coat coming between 
the knees and crotch. He couldn't identify the type of 
coat. The person had a cleft chin, long nose, hair on 
the darker side, and was seen at the north end of the 
Susan Kay Apartments at about 12 :25 a.m. January 5th. 
He stated certain features resembled l\Iiss Sinclair but 
could not point them out on cross examination when 
confronted by the defendant. The witness : "Vvould you 
please turn to the side. I see there isn't any S curve or 
cleft chin as pronounced" (R. 982). The State again 
made no effort to identify the defendant as the person 
seen by the witness. 
During the trial there were several light colored 
trench coats hanging on the coat racks which were 
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pointed out by the prosecutor for type and comparison. 
Ther~ is also testinwny that Yaughn llumphreys has a 
faYln colored thrt>t>·quarter length trench coat, and th.at 
Billie Rawlins has such a coat. The cleaner identified the 
eoat in his establish1nent as a full length overcoat. The 
8ta.te, other than inference, n1ade no attempt to clailn 
the eoat at the cleaners was the same coat that was seen 
by either "\Villiams or .Harvey at the scene of the crime. 
'Vithout inference or interpretation from the testi. 
mony of K~uehne, the defendant's taking a coat to the 
c.leaners on January 5th is consistent with innocence. 
It should also be noted that the articles were taken to 
her regular cleaners and not to a self.service eleaners 
or a strange establishment, and were not picked up for 
~PvPral days. 
Again, State v. Baum, supra, cites the Utah law on 
the present fact situation set forth above, eighteen beer 
bottles similar to those stolen in the Baum case were 
found in the defendant's house. The Court states at 
page ;>19: 
.. \Ye think the corroboration insufficient to 
connect the defendant with the offense of bur-
glary, the offense with which he was charged 
and convicted. The empty bottles found in his 
house were not even shown to have been taken 
from the cellar." 
State r. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d. 51, gives a 
t borough discussion of the tests of sufficiency of cor-
roboration in this State, and cites from thirty Utah 
cases therein. People r. Thurmond, supra, a late Cali-
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fornia case, discusses in detail all the State'::; claims for 
corroboration, pointing out in each instance that tlH· 
contention without inference or interpretation from the 
testimony of an accomplice does no nwre than ereate 
a suspicion when related to acts with which the defendant 
was charged. In that case, defendant was convicted of 
twenty separate charges of perversion under Californi'a 
Penal Code 288(a), and undoubtedly as did this Statt~·~ 
contention of a Lesbian relationship in the case on ap-
peal, caused the jury to ignore the insufficiency of the 
evidence and convict on a basis of prejudice arising from 
what they considered to be unnatural and abhorrent. 
The Baum case cited above has not been overruled in 
this jurisdiction. 
There is not a scintilla of evidence to corroborate 
Kuehne's testimony, and on the other hand, four wit-
nesses testified to the presence of the defendant in her 
h01ne some miles from the scene of the crime both at 
the time the crime was committed and during the period 
when Kuehne insists that she was at his apartment some 
thirty blocks away. See the testimony of :Jlildred Sin-
clair, Lamond Sinclair, Ellen Rawlins, and Bessie An-
derson. Even State's witnesses Reva Nelson and Thelma 
Eatche1l, used in rebuttal to impeach the alibi, tend to 
bear out defendant's presence at the rest home. \Vitness 
Nelson saw her there at 8:20p.m. when :Jiildred Hinclair 
was warming pizza for Jean Sinclair (R. 1656), while 
Kuehne claims she was at his apartment fr01n 8:30 to 
11 :00 p.m. Thelma Eatchel says she ~aw her when com-
ing down the stairs at 1 :20 a.m. January 5th to get the 
first of two shots for patients Austin and Harris. The 
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nan·oti<· logs in PvidPIH'P show hy what witness Eatchell 
:mvs was h<'r handwriting that the second of the two 
:-;hots, that given to ~lae Austin, w.as recorded as given 
at l :00 a.m. 
Th<· evidence that the State contends corroborates 
Kuehne's testimony in eaeh case is consistent with the 
innoePill'l' of defendant and can do no more than cast 
a ~uspicion on the accused. The well settled law is 
thnt thi~ is not sufficient. The Court should reven;e 
nnd order the defendant discharged. 
POINT V 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
After verdiet and prior to judgment, defendant made 
timely motion for new trial (R. 109-110) with supporting 
affidavits (R. 11:2 through 120) based on (a) three in-
stances of jury 1nisconduct, (b) the errors of the Court 
heretofore discussed as Points 1, :2, 3 and 4, and (c) 
newly discovered evidence. 
The Court, after considering affidavits and counter 
affidavits and hearing arguments on the law, denied the 
motion. 
The instances of jury misconduct were as follows: 
(a) Richard Dibblee, the County Attorney who 
handled the prelhninary hearing, admittedly shook hands 
\\ith an alternate juror in the hall outside the courtroom 
and had a conversation with him. The affidavits (R. 
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112) and counter affidavits (R. 122-123) differ as to 
whether other jurors were present. 
(h) Juror No. 12, Riley, talked with a spectator on 
three different dates during the trial and provided her 
with .autographs and addresses of all twelve jurors prior 
to deliberation (R. 113-115). l-Ie also discussed the trial 
with her (R. 113 and 123). 
(c) Juror No. 10, A. A. Firmage, who was later 
foreman .of the jury, approached, shook hands, and had 
.a conversation with State's witness Gerritadina Combee 
as she was stepping from the witness stand at a reoess. 
This took place before the rest of the jury and the en-
tire Oourt. This matter was immediately called to the 
attention of the Court. 
The instances set forth in (a) and (b) above were 
unknown to the defense counsel until after the trial. 
This Court stated in State v. Ander.son, 65 Utah 415; 
237 P. 941: 
"The authorities, however, all agreed that 
any conduct or relationship between a juror and 
.a party to an action during trial would or might 
consciously or unconsciously tend to influence the 
judgment of the juror authorizes and requires 
the granting of a new trial unless it is made to 
appear affirmatively that the judgment of the 
juror was in no way .affected by such relationship 
or that the parties by their conduct waived their 
right to make objection to such conduct ... but 
it should also be remembered that when a juror 
is selected by reason of his impartiality to de-
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termin~·. not only property rights between indi-
vidual:-; but in critninal ca~P~. involving lives and 
pPt'8onal liberties of the individual charged with 
offeJt~P~, the law n•quires of tlw juror such con-
dud during that tinw that his verdict may be 
ahm:p sw.;picion a:-; to its having been influenced 
hy <lit~· <·onduct on his part during the trial. ... " 
'fhe Court then reviews authorities. 
In State v. ()rank, a L'"tah hmnicide case, 142 P. 2d 
liS. approving the Anderson case, this Court stated: 
''In the case at the bar Ashcroft too was the 
prosecution's witness and had taken a prominent 
part in the trial of the case .... The conversation 
in question took plaee as alleged in counter affi-
davits in open court almost within hearing of the 
defendants and their counsel and affidavits of 
both the juror and the witness are to the effect 
that they were not discussing the case but merely 
talking in a friendly fashion. In spite of these 
extenuating circu1nstances this oonduct is eer-
tainly improper and is to be condemned by the 
Court, particularly in capital eases where the life 
or liberty of the defendant is at stake. In such 
instances the verdict of the jury, like Caesar's 
wife, must be above suspicion. In the instant case, 
~in<_>e a new trial 1nust be granted on other 
grounds, we need not deter1nine whether such 
conduct would alone be grounds for a new trial." 
(Emphasis the Court's.) 
.Also see State r. Th.orne, 39 l'"tah 208, 117 P. 58, at 
page 66, and cases cited therein. 
It is noted that the factual situation in State L 
Crank Is so similar to the Firmage-Gombee situation 
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in this case as to be ahnost indistinguishahh'. The ('a~r:-; 
are both capital cases; the juror shook hands with and 
conversed with the State's witness before the rest of the 
jury, the Court, and counsel. In both instances, affidavit~ 
of the principals would indicate the case "·as not di~­
cussed. However, in State L'. Crank, the Court held the 
conduct to be improper and refrained from rulill~ 
whether this conduct alone would be grounds for reversal 
only because the case was alr·ead:· being reversed on 
other grounds. It would seem that in the case on appeal, 
there are three distinct instances equally as adverse to 
jury impartiality as in the Crank case, supra, and in-
volving three different jurors; one, the ultimate foreman 
of the jury, before the rest of the jury and the entire 
Court; another, an alternate juror in contact with the 
prosecuting official who had been responsible for the 
case through preliminary hearing; and the third, through 
his conduct involving all men1bers of the jury by pro-
curing their signatures and addresses to furnish a spec-
tator who was purportedly going to write a boo!k about 
the trial. The mere procuring of the signatures would 
create a necessary inference that he had discussed with 
the other jurors his conversations with the spectator in 
order to give a reason for requiring their signatures 
and addresses and in some instances phone numbers (see 
R. 114-115). 
There is no way to determine whether these in-
stances or any of them might have consciously or un-
consciously influenced one or more jurors, State v. 
Anderson, supra. The burden is on the State to affirma-
tively show an absence of any such effect. State v. 
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.lnderson and Staff' 1'. Cra11k, :-;upra. It would seem that 
any of the thn•e in~tances alone would be grounds for 
a new trial and tlw combination of thP three in a capital 
t·a:-:P should mal<e a reversal imperative. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PREJUDICIAL 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN EVIDENCE OVER PROPER 
OBJECTION. 
In five in:-;tanee~ the Court allowed the District 
.\ttornl'Y to go into conversations between a witness and 
a third party, S"aid conversations taking place out of the 
presence of the defendant being immaterial and incom-
petent and not under any exception to the hearsa~' rule. 
(a) Vaughn Humphreys was allowed to testify to 
the context of a conversation between he and Carl 
Kuehne regarding a plot to kill Don LeRoy Foster (R. 
7-ll-1-t-~). Both Kuehne and Humphreys were State's 
witnPsses. The eonversation would appear to a jury to 
corroborate Kuehne's testimony, though the universal 
rule is that an accomplice eannot eorroborate himself. 
{b) L.aRae l(uehne on rebuttal was allowed, over 
objection, to testify to a eonversation between she and 
~Iildred Sinclair out of the presenee of the defendant (R. 
163:!-1634). The effect of the testimony was to impair 
the defendant's alibi, but was not impeaehing evidence as 
to ~Iildred Sinel.air as she had not been questioned re-
~aniing the conversation (R. 1634). The Court denied 
defendant's n1otion to strike and to admonish the jury. 
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(c) The Court allowed private detective B. 11..,. Ro-
Inano to relate a conversation between he and ~rhayle 
Olsen not in the presence of the defendant (R. 1637-1639) 
over objection by the defendant. The conversation re-
lated to hiring a detective to follow LaRae Peterson and 
Don Foster and is not shown to have been "·ithin the 
knowledge of the defendant. 
(d) Beth Foster, wife of the deceased, was allowed 
to relate two purported conversations with Thayle OlseH 
(R. 1638-1651), neither conversation being in the pres-
ence of the defendant. Both conversations related to the 
Foster-Peterson relationship. The second conversation 
contained the following statement by witness Beth 
Foster: 
"She told me that Jean Sinclair was an ex-
pert marksman, that there had been a shooting 
three or four years ago in :Magna. I :know nothing 
of it. This is all she said, in which Jean Sinclair 
had been mixed up. She said I could not under-
estimate her. She usually gets what she goes out 
for, and she says Don is in danger unless you 
stop it" (R. 1650). 
(e) Reva Nelson was allowed to relate a conversa-
tion with Ellen Rawlins out of the presence of defendant 
and over objections (R. 1659-1660). 
Each conversation was hearsay and incornpetent, 
and each extremely prejudicial to the defendant, espe-
cially so Mrs. Foster's hearsay statement regarding the 
defendant being involved in a shooting in :Magna three 
or four years ago. 
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'rlw l>i~trid Attornpy rlaimed that the conversation~ 
go to impeaclnnent of the various witnesses. However, 
in (a) above, both witnP~~p:-; wPre the State's witnesses, 
and in the ('a~t-:-; of ('b), (c), and ( P) a careful search of 
thP record shows that the conversations were not gone 
into or mentioned in the testimony of the witnesses pur-
portedly impeached, and in (d) above Thayle Olsen ad-
mittP(l to conversations with ~frs. Beth Foster but the 
substance of the conversation was not pursued, nor 
Wlntld it have been Inaterial or competent had it been 
pursued. ~l r::;. Foster's relations of the text of the eon-
n~rsations could only prejudice the defendant and did 
not impearh witness Olsen. 
\Varren on Homicide, Permanent Ed., Vol. 4, page 
f>n7. sets out the rule regarding prejudicial admissions 
of t>vidence : 
··It is a well established fact that error in 
admitting illegal evidence on a trial for homicide 
where plainly without prejudice to the accused is 
not grounds for reversal. If, however, the accused 
may lw ce been prejudiced by improper evidence, 
even though it be doubtful whether he was or not, 
that will be grounds for reversing a judgn1ent." 
(~Jmphasis added) 
Here, the text cites some fifty cases including State v. 
Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58. 
Citing 'Varren, supra, at page 589: 
"It is sufficient to authorize reversal if the 
testimony erroneously admitted tended or was 
calculated to injure the defendant with the jury." 
Again citing State L". Thorne, supra. 
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Each conversation is hean;ay, incompetent and 
highly prejudicial to the defendant and should require 
a reversal. Can it be said that in any one of the five 
instances, the conversation was not "calculated to injure 
the defendant with the jury"~ 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 
9 AND 10 AND REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2, 3 AND 4. 
The Court erred in giving Instructions No. 9 and 
10 for the reasons set forth in Point III, that under the 
factual set up of this case the question of accomplicity 
of Carl Kuehne is a question of law for the Court. The 
Court, after denying defendant's Motion for a directed 
verdict should have ruled that Kuehne was an accomplice 
as a matter of law and given proper instructions on cor-
roborative evidence; or ruled as a matter of law that 
Kuehne was not an accomplice and refrained from giving 
instructions on corroboration. State v. Ripley, supra, 
with annotations at 19 A.L.R. 1355. 
Further, the two instructions as given are not the 
law, fail to set forth adequately what constitutes an ac-
complice and are confusing to the jury. 
The Court, in using the State's requested instruc-
tion as the Court's Instruction K o. 9 in paragraph 3 
there-of, uses the words "knowingly and with criminal 
intent aid or abet or having advised and encouraged the 
commission of the act charged," then in paragraph -1 
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uses the :-;ntne words ••knowingly and with cri1ninal in-
tl•nt'' in an at tempt tP define aid and ahet. r:rhe Court 
then negativt>~ any t>fi'Pet of Instruction i\o. 9 by stating 
in Instruction ~ o. 10 "that 1nerely aiding and assisting 
in the t·onuni:-;:;ion of a crilne without guilty knowledge 
or intent is not eriminal and the person aiding or assist-
ing without guilty knowledge or intent is not an accom-
plice." ~rhe Court nowhere defines knowingly, guilty 
kno\riPdgl', or criininal intent. 
The Court in Instruction No. 12 (R. -±4) defines in-
tent and ~1weific intent, neither of which has the san1e 
meaning as criminal intent. 
.. \Vhere a technical tenn or terms which have 
aequired particular significance in the law are en1-
11loyPd in instructions, the Court should point out 
the meaning to the jury unless the 1neaning is 
already elPar." Reid's Branson Instructions to 
Judes, Yol. 1, p. 174. 
It was the duty of the Court in this case to define 
to the jury knowingly, crilninal intent, and guilty knowl-
edge. Abo, it was error for the Court to combine the 
words ''knowingly and with criminal intent" where either 
guilty lrnowledge or criminal intent are sufficient alone, 
the criminal intent being inferred fro1n the guilty knowl-
edge. Pnder the evidence in this case Carl l{uehne, front 
hi~ own testimony, knew the purpose of Jean Sinclair 
when he did the acts to which he testified at the trial. 
.\~ pointed out \\ith repetition in the Staten1ent of Fa0ts, 
he gave a false name when buying the gun and sheUs 
because Jean had been threatening to kill Foster. He 
knew .. it was her avowed purpose to kill Foster" (R. 716). 
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He unloaded the shells before the crin1e because she said 
she only needed one. He went with her to the various 
places to advise her where would be the best place to 
kill Foster. Kuehne had guilty knowledge and the failure 
to define the terms guilty knowledge, knowingly and 
criminal intent was error. It has been held error not to 
define "knowingly," Reid's Branson Instruct<ions to 
Juries, Vol. 1, p. 175, citing People v. Stewart, 68 Cal. 
App. 621, 230 P. 221. Failure to define aiding and 
abetting is error. Same citation as above. 
The Court attempts in Instruction No. 9 to define 
aid and a;bet, but merely reverses the use of the words 
"knowingly and with criminal intent" in Paragraph 3 
of the same instruction defining accomplice. The Court, 
by its failure to define these terms and by using know-
ingly and with criminal intent in the disjunctive in In-
struction No. 9 and in the conjunctive in Instruction No. 
10, could have no effect but to confuse the jury. 
With regard to the question of intent, there is also 
case law to the effect that criminal intent is presumed. 
The defendant in criminal prosecutions is presumed to 
intend the ordinary results of his voluntary acts. State 
v. Owen, 119 Ore. 15, 244 P. 560. The slightest degree of 
assistance or collusion is sufficient. Comm. v. Lowry, 
374 Pa. 594, 98 Atlantic 2d 733, Cert. Den. 347 U.S. 914, 
98 L. Ed. 1017, 74 S. Ct. 479. It is immaterial whether 
the aider and abettor has any direct or personal interest 
in the results of the crime or whether he· will gain in 
any way thereby U.S. v. llfoss, 122 F. Sup. 523, Rev. on 
other grounds, C A. 3d, 220 F 2d 166. 
72 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If one person a~~isted anotlwr in doing a criminal 
ad, it is prt>~umed he shared the intent wjth \\·hich the 
pt>r~on w~ doing the act. H"lwrfou's Cri111ioal El:ideilce, 
1 ~th J1~d., \" ol. 1, p. :2-!(i. If a person advising or eounsel .. 
ing the crime changes his 1nind he is still liable as an 
U.C.'('P~~ory if ht- does not inforn1 the principal of his 
changed desires. Stat(' v. Allen, -!7 Conn. 121, Wharton's 
C. L. & P., 1 :2th Ed. 2:~9. 
•·Jn order to be an accessory before the fact 
it i:-; neeessary that the actor know that he is 
taking a step to pronwte the commission of a 
erimP. It is not necessary that the accomplice 
before the fad have full knowledge of all the de-
tails of the criminal plan or the identity of all 
persons participating therein. It is not necessary 
that the defendant should have originated the de-
:-;ign of com1nitting the offense if the principal 
had previously fanned the design, and the alleged 
accomplice encouraged hiin to carry it out by 
falsehood or otherwise, he is guilty as an acces-
:;ory before the fact." \Yharton's 12th Ed. citing 
Keeleher L'. State, 10 Smedes & M (niiss.) 192. 
The ~tate contends that l(uehne had withdrawn 
prior to the killing. However, the evidence shows that 
immediately before she left to "kill myself a son-of-a-
bitch" he sawed off the gun, unloaded the shells, and 
showed her how to load the gun and put it on safety, and 
expressed not the least surprise when she came back 
and told hin1 to dispose of the weapon and shells. 
The Court in Instruction ~ o. 9 fails to set forth that 
an aooompliee is a prineipal and that an aidor and abettor 
need not be present at the scene of the crime. See 76-
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1--±-L This in conjunction with the Court's instruction t'P-
garding alibi and the Court's failure to define guilty 
knowledge and criminal intent is further confusing to 
the jury. The evidence shows that Kuehne was an ae-
complice. He had guilty knowledge of the purpose of the 
acts he did allegedly at the request of Jean Sinclair. I I(· 
aided and abetted and became an accessory to the killing 
of Don Foster. The Court by giving its Instructions No. 
9 and 10, and refusal to give defandant's requested In-
structions No. 2, 3 and 4, left the jury in a state of con-
fusion .as to the necessity of corroborative evidence. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6, NO. 17, NO. 20. 
It was the defendant's contention and theory in the 
alternative from the opening state1nent on, that there 
was more evidence to connect Carl Kuehne to the killing 
of Don Foster than there was the defendant, and that 
l{uehne had no alibi. Secondly, that Carl Kuehne 
was an .accomplice to the killing of Don Fo~tPr and his 
testimony should be viewed with distrust and must be 
corroborated. r:rhe Court, by its deletions of the last 
paragraph of the requested Instruction K o. 6, and the 
first paragraph of Instruction No. 20, failed to present 
to the jury the defendant's theory of the case. The 
rule in Civil cases requiring the Court to instruct on 
all theories of the case having supported in evidence 
to any extent, has a like application in criminal prosecu-
tions. See Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, Yol. 
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l., St·d i()n ;):;, p. 170. ThP a.<·<·u:.;ed i~ entitled to have 
the jury in:.;truct('<l on the whole law of the case. See 
.lunnlatiuu of Ucid's /Jransou rol. 1, p. 170, Note 57. 
It i~ error for a trial court to fail to give equal 
~h·(·~~ to tlw <·ontentions of the State and the defendant. 
'fhi~ doe~ not necessarily mean that the staternents of 
the opposing parties be of equal length, but there is a 
lnek of Pqnal ~trP~~ when the State's contentions are given 
at great length and detail while, on the other hand, 
tlw dPI'Pndanfs contentions are given in very brief gen-
Pral tpnn~ a:-; though he had offered no evidence at all. 
Hl'ifi's Branson, lrol. 1, p. 172. The court may instruct 
upon all tlworieH of the defense though they may nec-
P~~arily conflict. The instruction should be given though 
the evidence in support of the theory is slight. The in-
~truction ~hould cover contentions made and argued 
before the jury and the theory rnust be presented pertin-
t~ntly, plainly, and affirmatively. 
\\~here the accused in his statement presents a 
theory. which if true, entitles him either to acquittal or 
convietion of a lower offense than the one charged, it 
i~ error to refuse a written request applicable to such 
theory. Di:icr r. State, 12 Ga. App. 722, 78 S. E. 203. 
The Court by striking the first portion of defendant's 
requested Instruction K o. :20 and failing to instruct as 
reque~ted Instruction No. 17, that the defendant's theory 
\ra~ that Cnrll\::uehne was an accomplice* has eliminated 
from the instructions any clear statement of the defend-
*The Court in Instruction No. 17 has endorsed the instruction 
g-iven in substance. This is not the fact. 
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ant's theory. The only place Carl Kuehne's name is even 
mentioned in the instructions is in the remaining portion 
of defendant's requested Instruction No. 20, the Court's 
given Instruction No. 19 which makes Court's Instruction 
No. 19 incomplete and leaves a total failure of instruc-
tions as a whole to set out the defendant's theory of the 
case. This error compounds the errors heretofore dis-
cussed in Point VII as the Court instructs incompletely 
as to accomplices and aiding and abetting but refuses to 
instruct as to the defendant's theory that I{uehne was an 
accomplice. The Court gives various instructions on re-
quirements of corroboration, but by its deletions of de-
fendant's requested instruction No. 6 and No. 20, and 
failure to set forth Carl Kuehne at any point as the 
claimed accomplice, leaves Instructions No. 9 and No. 10 
and the various instructions on corroborating, literally 
hanging in the air. It should be remembered that there 
are sixty-four (64) witnesses in the case on appeal. 
It should further be noted that the Court granted as 
written, all requests set forth by the State. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEF'ENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 30. 
The State's theory as set forth in the Court's in-
structions was that Jean Sinclair n1urdered Don LeRoy 
Foster; not that she conspired with another or was 
a principal, was an accomplice or an accessory before 
the fact to the homicide. The defendant's requested 
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instruction ~ o. 30 prohi hi ted the jury frmn convicting 
Miss Sinclair unless tlwy found th.at she fired the shot 
that killed I >on Foster. There is no evidence of nor 
i:-; there any claim by the State that !\Liss Sinclair aided, 
abetted, was a conspirator or an accomplice. There was 
also no evidence that i\Liss Sinclair was at or near 
the ~eene of the cri1ne at the time that it happened, 
and the evidence by Carl Kuehne was such that the 
jury could well have believed she conspired with him 
or he and others to commit the murder. "Where the 
indictment• charges that the defendant alone committed 
the offense, it is error to instn1ct the jury that conviction 
i:-; authorized if the accused aided and abetted the com-
mission of the crime," Till1nan v. Commonwealth, 259 
Ky. ~~~' 82 SW2d 222. "Where the defendant is charged 
as a principal, the instructions should point out clearly 
what acts or conduct constitutes defendant a principal," 
I·J'!li::;o·n v. Commonwealth, 130 Ya. 738, 107 SE 689. 
The Court's instruction No. 9 and 10, heretofore 
discussed in Point VII with regard to accomplice, could 
well have confused the jury in their interpretation of 
X o. 8, especially as the Court refused to instruct on 
the defendant's theory as to who the claimed accomplice 
was. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING STATE'S OB-
JECTIONS TO COUNSEL'S QUESTIONS AS TO WHY CARL 
Kl'EHNE HAD NOT BEEN ARRESTED OR CHARGED. 
*In this case, the information 
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After laying the foundation as to knowledge of the 
statements of Carl Kuehne b~· Richard Dibblee, Chief 
Criminal Deputy, Salt Lake County Attonw~··~ Office, 
defense· counsel asked : 
"Why didn't you have a complaint filed 
against ~Ir. Kuehne, :Jir. Dibblee '!" 
t.Ir. Banks: "I'll object to that, your Honor, 
it's immaterial." 
Mr. Hatch: "I don't think it's immaterial 
after the foundation we've laid." 
Mr. Banks: "I think it is. That's an entirely 
separate affair." (R. 1591). 
After arguments thereon the Court sustained the 
objection (R. 1592). The question n1ust be material as 
the defense's theory in the opening statement and 
through the entire trial was that Carl 1-\::uehne, h)· his 
own statements and production of evidence, had impli-
cated himself in the murder of Don Foster, had no 
alibi, and was a more likely suspect for the killing than 
the defendant. ·The evidence shows that the police had 
discussed with Kuehne a pardon for a previous crime, 
after which he gave them statements sufficient to war-
rant a complaint against him for first degree murder 
as a principal, and facts sufficient for a conviction of 
being an accessory after the fact. There has been no 
charge or arrest. The only logical reason for not charg-
ing Kuehne for one crime or both would be that upon 
his refusal to testify there would be no evidence what-
soever against the defendant Jean Sinclair. Further. the 
statements given by l(uehne would not hold up as a 
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eonfp;.;:-~ion a~ainst hiinself, due to the nwtlwds of obtain-
ing thP :-~tatement~, including faihirP to advise hin1 of 
his eon:-~titutional rights, the thinly veiled promise of help 
with a pardon, and holding hin1 incommunicado without 
\'hlll'g"P. 
rrhe matter wa:-; opened first by the District Attor-
m•y when he asked J(uehne \vhy he refused to testify 
(H. 698-699). Defense counsel followed up the matter 
on cross examination where the witness stated "that 
he belit•\·ed that the County Attorney was acting as my 
attorney" (R. 713). 
'l'lw question was highly 1naterial for two reasons; 
one, with regard to the question of whether or not 
Kuehn<' was chargeable \vith the crime and therefore a 
principal and an ac-cessory before the fact. vVitness 
Dibblee was the prosecutor who had authorized the com-
plaint against the defendant solely on Kuehne's state-
menb_,, The Court itself e1nphasized the nmteriality of 
this question in instruction No. 9, second paragraph, as 
follows: 
"An accomplice is one who is liable to pros-
ecution for the identical offense charged against 
the defendant on trial" ( R. 40). 
It i~ apparent that the question of why Kuehne was not 
charged was material to the defense's theory of accom-
plicity of Kuehne. Secondly, the question is 1naterial 
in laying a foundation for proper impeachment of 
Kuehne on the basis of promises not to charge hin1 if 
he testified or threats to issue a con1plaint if he refused 
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to testify. True, K.uelme denied threats or promi~e~, 
but the examination by the District Attorney at R. 698-
699 and the cross examination at R. 713 show~ not only 
evidence of promises not to prosecute but an indication 
that either the police or one of the prosecuting official~ 
had informed him that the County Attorne~· was acting 
as his attorney. 
This ties in directly with J(uehne's late effort to 
invoke privilege arising from self-incrimination to qn<'l'-
tions regarding the shot gun and shells. 
Witness Dibblee was the person having authority to 
issue a criminal complaint, and the reason he did not 
authorize such a complaint is 1naterial to the defense's 
theory and was not incompetent for any reason. 
POINT XI 
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN COMPELLING CARL KUEHNE TO TES-
TIFY OVER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE. 
Carl Kuehne refused to answer questions regarding 
the purchase of a shot gun for Jean Sinclair on the basiH 
that the answer might tend to incriminatP him. The 
Court, after argument, compelled the witness to testify. 
Apparently upon the reasoning set forth by :.\lr. Banks: 
"Your Honor, I will invite the Court's atten-
tion to the preliminary hearing transcript which 
vou have read and this defendant has waived 
~ny iminunity he might have by reason of that, 
in 1ny opinion, and request the Court to compel 
hiln to answer." (R. 569). 
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Tlw Court eompelled thP an~wer (H. 370). 
rehe Court: "lt'H the finding of the Court, 
~lr. KtwhnP, that you 1nu~t answer all questions 
involved.'' 
The \\'itnes8: HAll questions in regard to 
this f" 
The ( 10Urt: "That's correct." 
Wltt>t'eupon, defense counsel requested an objection to 
each qtw~tion involving the shot gun (R. 570). 
1'he witness Kuehne endeavored again and again 
to refuse to answer questions regarding the shot gun, 
the ~hell~, the purchase of them, giving thmn to lVIiss 
Sinclair, and disposal of the gun and shells. The Court 
was in error in requiring the witness to testify after 
Itt> <'laimed his privilege. There is no argument that 
the privilege is personal to the witness. However, the 
witne~s claimed the privilege and was compelled to 
answer by the Court. There can be no doubt that any 
question with regard to the shot gun and shells would 
or might tend to incrilninate Kuehne either for the 
erime of murder in the first degree or as being an 
aeet>s~ory after the fact. The, law is clear that the privi-
lege attaches to each hearing and the fact that a witness 
testified at a coroner's hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a preliminary hearing of the instant trial, or to 
tl1e 8ame facts in another case, does not constitute a 
waiver of the privilege when claimed by him. See State 
r. A.Uiso·n, 116 Jlont. 352, 153 P.2d 141; Ex parte Sales, a 
California case, ~4 P. 2d 916; Ot·erand v. Superior Court, 
131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372; In rc Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37, 
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287 P. 126; also under Hill's Crin1inal Evidence, Vol. ~' 
Section 358. 
That the testinwny was prejudicial to the defendant 
1s too clear to require argument. Without l(uehne'~ 
testimony regarding procuring of the gun and shells, 
alteration of the gun and shells, delivery to her of the 
gun and one shell, and disposal of the gun and shells, 
there would be no case at all against l\1iss Sinclair. While 
it is true that the privilege is personal and cannot be 
claimed by the defendant in lieu of the witness, the 
witness did claim the privilege and was improperly 
cmnpeUed to testify. !The testimony is involuntary and 
under cmnpulsion of the Court. There can he no question 
that the witness was entitled to the privilege. The Court 
could not have found that the testimony did not or might 
not, or the answers did not or might not, tend to incrimin-
ate Kuehne. See United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 
25 Federal cases, page 38, No. 14692E, where Chief 
Justice Marshall lays down the rules with regard to 
the nature of the self-incrimination. If the Court hatl 
not erroneously compelled this testimony, there could 
have been no conviction. 
Professor vVigmore discusses this question and 
seems to advocate that only the witness can object to 
compelled testimony, and that the party should not be 
so allowed. However, he points out that the majority 
of Oourts allow a party to take exception under what 
he calls the "sporting rule," see 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 
3rd Ed. 2196. Commonwealth v. Kimball, Mass. 24, Peck 
366 and 368, allows objection by a party and bases a 
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rpvpn;al thereon u:-;iu~ thP following language: 
"l t could not be held that the verdict was 
~upportt>d by legal evidence.'' 
Cummuntcealth u. 8/wu:, 4 Cush. 594, approves Common-
wealth v. K.imball. State v. Ulill, ~:3 Wis. 309, at page 
31H discussing the question, states: '"It seems that a 
party may appeal." This Court in State v. Cox, 277 
P. 97~, at page 973 under a claiin of error fr01n compelled 
testimony of an accon1plice, refuses to discuss the ques-
tion on Uw basis that the witness was not compelled 
to answer any particular questions over his objection 
on the ground of privilege. 
This i~ but another example of the .apparent pre-
judiee of the Court in its ruling throughout the trial 
with regard to admission and exclusion of evidence 
(:-;pp Point YI). 
LaRae Peterson was compelled to take a contempt 
rather than answer the incriminating question. 
POINT XII 
THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL AND CONVICTION WERE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE CONSTITUTION 0 F THE UNITED STATES. 
The Fifth Amendn1ent of the United States Con-
stitution provides among other privileges and immunities 
to the person as follows : 
"No person shall be held to answer for a 
captital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indicbnent of a Grand Jury." 
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The Fourteenth ... t\.mendment provide:-; that : 
"All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the 17nited States and of 
the State wherein they reside. X o State shall 
Inake or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges and irmnunities of citizens of the 
United States. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Mapp v. Ohio, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, holds that the 
right of security of a person under the Fourth Amend-
ment makes an unreasonable search and seizure un-
constitutional when applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States, Justice Black in concurring therein 
points out that the rights granted under the F~urh and 
Fifth Amendments are part of the privilege~ and im-
munities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Ar.aendment. The 
l\fapp case, supra, reversed the stand the Court had 
taken some 34 years before with relation to the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
applying to State Courts. 
The same reasoning used In the Mapp ease as to 
unreasonable search and seizure is applicable to cases 
arising under the guarantee of the privileges and immun-
ities set forth in Fifth Amendment. In mruking the 
above argument the writer is aware of the case of 
I-Iurtailo v. Cal·ifornia. 110 U.S. 516, where the defendant 
claimed that his homicide conviction was unconstitutional 
on the same basis as the claim here made. However, 
the case of Mapp v. Ohio, supra, would appear to reverse 
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the Hurtado case by implication without expressly doing 
~0. 
Jean Sinclair was proceeded against by cornplaint 
(R. 3) and infonnation (R. 10) in a prosecution for 
murder in the first degree, a capital case (76-30-3 and 
7(i-~m--t-, ecA 1953). The l~tah Constitution, Article 1, 
~t-d ion :~ ~tates as follows: 
"The State of Utah is an inseparable part 
of th<> federal union and the Constitution of the 
Fnih•d Htah•s is the supreme law of the land." 
lTtah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
•· K o person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law." 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, provides for 
prosecutions by infonnation, or indictment in the alterna-
tive. 
The ca~e of In re illcf{ee, 57 P. 23, 19 Utah 231, 
is informative on the subject, as is JJf axwell v. Dowell, 
17H r.S. 581, -1-J. Ed. 597, 20 Supreme Court -1-18, with 
Justice Harlan dissenting, affinning 19 Utah 495, 57 
P. -112. That case holds that the liberties and immunities 
gu.aranteeed by the Fourteenth Amendment are not 
violated by Section 10, Article I of the Utah State Con-
stitution in its application to the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. However, it should be 
observed that Amendment YI is a general guarantee 
of speedy trial by impartial jury, and requires that 
defendant be informed of the nature and cause of the 
nrru8ation, to be confronted by witnesses, to have com-
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pulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to have the 
assistance of counsel. On the other hand, Amendment 
V provides that no person shall be held to am:;\\'('1' 
for a capital crime unless on presentment or indictment, 
and allowing prosecution of a capital crime h.v informa-
tion is a distinct violation and abridgement of one of the 
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Maxwell case, supra, rules on the question of 
prosecution of a non-capital felony by information, which 
is nowhe·re prohibited by the Constitution of the United 
States. 
POINT XIII 
THE COURT, AFTER ERRONEOUSLY COMPELLING 
LaRAE PETERSON TO 'TESTIFY, OVER CLAIM OF PRIVI-
LEGE AND COMPELLING AN ANSWER WHICH SHE RE-
FUSED TO GIVE, FAILED TO ADMONISH THE JURY 
THAT NO INFERENCE OF WHAT THE ANSWER WAS 
OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN, CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE 
REFUSAL TO ANSWER, AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
COMPOUNDED THE ERROR BY ARGUING THE MATTER 
IN HIS SUMMATION. 
The Court compelled LaRae Peterson to answer 
an improper question over proper objection. 
Mr. Banks: "I'll ask you if you or Jean have 
ever committed any Lesbian acts with each other." 
Mr. Hatch: "Objected to as ambiguous." 
Mr. ~iitsanaga: "Also may the record show 
counsel does invoke the privilege pursuant to 70 
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Ftuh Code m rPI't•rence to ~lr. Bank:.;' qm·~tion'' 
~It 4~7). 
'!'hereafter, on voir dire exan1ination, ~Lrs. Peterson 
ndmittPd she did not know whether it was possible for 
two women to have sexual relations with one another, 
nnd that she did not know what Lesbian acts were. The 
l'ourt indicated that the objection was well taken as 
being ambiguous at R. 783, the Court: ''I think to an 
extent it might be, especially in the light of the fact 
that it i~ difficult to dPfine, and that this witness does 
not seem clear on what you n1ean by that teTIII, as used." 
~,urther questions by ~lr. Banks: "Well, I'll put it this 
way tlH'll, have you had any homosexual acts with .Jean 
or Jean with you?" :Mr. Hatch: "Smne objection." De-
fpn:-;p counsel later added the objec1tion that the question 
was immaterial. ~Irs. Peterson, on advice of counsel, 
refused to an8wer the question, and the Court ordered 
her to do so. The ·witness still refused (R. 788). 
~li~~ Sinclair, when asked the same question, also 
invoked the privilege. The Court did not admonish the 
jury that they could not draw any inference fron1 the 
rt>fu~ab to answer as to what the answer may have been. 
~neh failure, even without request by counsel, is error. 
··Refusal of a witness to answer questions 
on the ground that answer 1nay tend to incrimin-
ate may not be used as a basis for inferring what 
the answer may have been. . . . If the prosecution 
knows when it puts the question that privilege 
will be clain1ed, it is charged with notice of the 
probable effect of the refusal on the jury's mind." 
C.S. 1-:. Jl alone_, etal. :2G2 F 2d 535. 
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ln the :Malone case the conviction was reversed 
on the basis that the Court did not give an admonition 
to the jury with regard to the creation of an inference 
from the refusal to answer. It cmnments that the prose-
cutor is charged with the notice of the probable effect 
of the refusal if he is aware that the refusal is coming. 
U.S. v. Five Cases, Second Circuit, 179 F. 2d 519, 
523, it was held that the District Attorney is charged 
with notice of the probable effect of the refusal on the 
jury's mind if he knew or had reasonable cause to know 
that the answer would result in a claim of privilege, 
and in U.S. v. O'Conner, Second Circuit, 237 ~_,. 2d 466 
and 472, the Court held that failure of the Court to 
admonish the jury resulted in reversible error although 
the accused did not ask for such adn1onition or instrue-
tion. This was done apparently on the theory as set forth 
in U.S. v. 1'Ialone, supra, that the necessity of a request 
of the defendant before the jury aggravated the possibil-
ity of an improper inference to the extent that it out-
weighed the admonition. 
The U.S. Supren1e Court 1n J!.,Tamet v. the United 
States, No. 134 October term 1962, published 11:ay 13, 
1963, fully discusses and approves the reasoning in the 
Malone case but differentiates that case from the Malone 
case on the basis of the conduct of the District Attorney. 
See also United States v. H·iss, 185 F. 2d 822, 823; United 
States v. Amodio, 215 F. 2d 605, 614, Seventh Circuit. 
In the case on appeal, the District Attorney wal'l 
well aware that privilege would be claimed, especially as 
to the question using the word "homosexual" as the 
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matter had been thoroughly argued in ('hambers ( R. 78-±). 
~lr. Ban:ks was on notice of the elaim of privilege and 
still pursued the matter. As in the ~[alone case, supra, 
the District Attorney co1npounded the error by ilnproper 
arbrument in his suuunary, where he stated: 
.. Now the <1uestion of hornosexuality has 
nothing to do with this case and the Court has 
instructed you only so far as it 1nay refer to 
motive. We are not trying Jean Sinclair for 
any rPlationship between LaRae Peterson and 
herself, but it does come into this case, unfortun-
atPly, because it provides motive. \Vhat is motive 
to kill t Through past experience, we have found 
a great love, a great hate, to be sufficient. There 
are great loves between women as there are be-
tween men. In fact, I think when this is found it 
is probably a more jealous love. There is certainly 
evidence in this case of a great jealousy. There 
is no wrath like a woman's wrath." (R. 1877-1878). 
The possible inferences fr01n the refusals to answer 
are the only evidence of a homosexual relationship in 
this ea~P, though there is inference through the entire 
record that the State accused Jean Sinclair of being a 
Lt>sbian. There are no other claims of "Lesbian acts or 
homosexual acts," as used by the District Attorney 111 
his questions to ~Irs. Peterson and ~Iiss Sinclair. 
The District Attorney's argument was also highly 
improper and prejudicial as there is no evidence in the 
rase of the jealousy of loves between 1nan and 1nan, 
man and woman, or woman and woman. His statement: 
"There are great loves between women as there are 
between men. In fact, I think when this is found it is 
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probably a 1nore jealous love" is not supported by either 
evidence or logic. It could only be calculated to inflame 
a jury with regard to an inferred and unnatural sexual 
relationship, of which there is no evidence. 
This is reversible error. 
POINT XIV 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING LESBIAN 
ACTS AND HOMOSEXUAL ACTS PUT TO LaRAE PETER-
SON AND TO THE DEFENDANT BY THE STATE. 
The question set forth in Point XIII, supra, were 
objected to by the counsel for the defendant as being 
ambiguous and immaterial. As pointed out heretofore, 
Mrs. Peterson admitted to voir dire she didn't know 
what a "Lesbian act" was and did not know whether 
there could be homosexual acts between women. "Les-
bian" is defined as follows : 
"1. Of or pertaining to Lesbos (now Myti-
lene), one of the Aegean Islands. 2. Erotic; -
in allusion to the reputed sensuality of the people 
of Lesbos. 3. Of or pertaining to Lesbianism." 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Second 
Edition, 482. 
None of the definitions connote an act or action. "Homo-
sexual" as used in the question to ~Irs. Peterson: 
"vVell, I'll put it this way then, have you had 
any homosexual acts with Jean or Jean with 
you~" 
1s also ambiguous. \Yebster defines "homosexual" a:-~ 
follo-ws: "Eroticisn1 for one of the same sex.,. \Vhat 
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a homosexual aet or a LP~hian act may be can differ 
with w; many people a~ thl·re are different individuals. 
'fhe quP~tions were not understood by either the witness 
or the jury, gave an itnproper inferentl', and were inl-
material. One has only to ask in •a group, "What is a 
Lesbian act or what is a homosexual act" and it will 
~·lieit as many different state1nents as there are people 
in the group. If the District Attorney would ask the 
:-\(H•eil'ie question with regard to kissing, fondling of 
hrpa:-;t~, cunilingus, sodomy, or other acts having a com-
mon a~ well as legal Ineaning, the question would not 
only have lost its ·ambiguity but would possibly have 
avoided the elaims of privilege and the inferenee neces-
sarily going to the jury as to what the answer might have 
lwl;:'n. ~Pe U.~-_1...,'. l'. 1lfalone, s11pra. 
POINT XV 
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE ·woRD "DIS-
TRUST" FROM DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 7 GIVING THAT SAME INSTRUCTION AS 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 16 USING THE WORD "CAU-
TION" IN PLACE OF "DISTRUST." 
The defendant, where there is a claimed accomplice 
called by the people, is entitled to an instruction govern-
ing the jury's consideration of the accomplice's testimony 
though he n1ade no request therefor. People v. ]}filler, 
~Cal. Reporter 91, p. 105 citing cases. The cases without 
variation, indicate that the requirement in the instruc-
tion is that the testilnony of an accomplice ought to be 
viewed with distrust. The failure to give the latter in-
~trnetion, when an accomplice is called as a witness by 
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the State, may constitute reversible error. Peo ]JI c r. 
D~ail, 22 Cal. 2d 642, 653-656, 140 P. 2d 822, citing ca~(·~. 
The words "caution" and "distrust" are not synonymous. 
Caution connotes wariness or prudence in regard to 
danger. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 2d Ed., 
p. 132; while distrust is to feel no trust or confidence 
in, to mistrust, or pointing out an active danger in the 
testimony of an accomplice rather than merely a caution 
to look for something wrong. Utah cases, without excep-
tion in discussing the question of acc01nplices, hold that 
their testimony is to he viewed with distrust due to their 
involvmnent in the matter concerned and the opportunity 
to better their own position by testimony incriminating 
to the person against whom they are testifying. Se<· 
State v. Gardner, supra, citing cases. The defendant 
was entitled to requested instruction No. 7 in its original 
form and failure to give the same was prejudicial error. 
POINT XVI 
THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF CARL KUEHNE. 
The Court refused to let counsel cross examine Carl 
Kuehne with respect to his prior convictions, although 
the District Attorney had "opened the door" hy going 
beyond the statutory questions in his dire·ct examination 
(R. 110). He went into an escape frOin the penitentiary 
fire-fighting detail (no felony charged), and a voluntary 
giving himself up in Nevada, and into the question of 
length of time served. The Court would not allow cross 
exmnination by defense counsel on the subject (R. 694). 
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'fhe Court n·ru~ed to h·t (•otm~el exrunine a~ to thP 
p~ychintric baekgrounJ of Carl K.uehne (R. 698). Coun-
~t'l twuh· proffl•r:-; of proof with regard to both lines of 
tP:'timony (H. 737 et :-;pq). Defendant wa~ prepared to 
:-;ubmit p~y<'hiatric evidence as to K.uehne'::~ being a p::~y­
t·lwpathie pt>rson.ality with schizophrenic tendencies 
nt·at ing a compulsion to aet out in a violent manner 
wlwn under stre:-;:-;, and casting doubt on his ability 
to tell the tnlth. rrhe line of questioning went both 
to hi~ credibility and cmnpetency and it was necessary 
to lay u. foundation with Carl Kuehne for introduc-
tion of ·the psychiatric evidence to get around the 
patient-physician privilege and to impeach Kuehne if 
he denied the p~~·ehiatric evaluations and treatment. 
'fhe District Attorney in questioning Kuehne with 
regard to his previous felony conviction at R. 170 went 
far beyond the scope of the allowable statutory ques-
tions regarding felony convictions. vV e do not attack 
th:~ examination on the basis of in1proper impeachment 
of tlll' State's own witness, State v. Holley, 34 N.J. 9, 
166 At. 2d 758, Certiorari Denied 368 U.S. 884, ·where 
such was held to be good trial strategy, but on improper 
re~triction on the defendant's cross examination. See 
State l'. Cude, Ftah Supreme Court X o. 9619, July 2, 
1963, where defense counsel opened the felony question 
'";th the defendant and the prosecutor was allowed to 
tros~ exrunine there-on. In the case on appeal, the prose-
cutor not only opened the felony question, but questioned 
rE-garding an escape on which no felony was charged 
and the method or Ineans of return to the prison (a pur-
ported turning himself In In Nevada), and the length 
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of incarceration. The Court refused to allow cross l'X-
amination regarding the witness' criminal record beyond 
the questions of type and number of felonies. 
Carl Kuehne was the State's principal witness, with-
out whon1 the State could make no connection between 
the defendant and the homicide charge. The Court un-
duly restricted cross examination with regard to the 
background and competency of the witness. 
"The right of cross examination in a criminal 
case is basic and is zealously guarded by the 
Courts . . . cross examination of a witness is a 
matter of right ... counsel often cannot :know in 
advance what pertinent facts may be elicited. For 
that reason, it is necessarily exploratory .... It 
is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable lati-
tude he given the cross examiner, even though 
he is unable to state to the Court what a reason-
able cross examination 1night develop .... " Al-
ford v. the U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 51 Sup. Ct. 218, 
7 5 L. Ed. 624. 
In the case on appeal, counsel told the Court by his 
proffers of proof precisely what he intended to develop 
(R. 737 et seq), and that evidence went to both the com-
petency .and credibility of the State's prime witness, Carl 
Kuehne. 
The Washington Supreme Court sitting en bane on 
June 6, 1963, reversed a first degree homicide conviction 
on the ground of a denial of substantive due process of 
law, even though the Court allowed a wide latitude and 
abundant time for cross exan1nation of the key witness, 
where the defendant was obliged to excessive restraint 
for fear of being blamed by the jury of goading a preg-
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nant womun. State r. Swellson, :~s~ P. :2d Gl-l. In that 
l'llSP tht- Court didn't rt>~trict the cro~~ examination by 
~n:-;tai 11 ing- ohjPet ion:-;, but ~howed gT<'at concern for the 
witness and callt,d numerous reces~e~ during cross ex-
amination due to her ph~·~ical condition. 
rrhe Court tmduly restricted the defendant's exam-
ination of the ~tatP's key witness on questions materjal 
to his background, 1nental condition, and cmnpetency. 
rrhe judgment should be revers·ed. 
POINT XVII 
THE DEFENDANT \VAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL 
:\ND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE 
GENERAL ATl\IOSPHERE OF THE TRIAL AND BY AN 
:\FFII~~IATIVE SHOWING OF PARTIALITY TO THE 
STATE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE THAT MUST NECES-
SARILY HAVE INFLUENCED THE JURY. 
1.,he entire atmosphe-re of the three-week trial was 
one of multitudes seeking sensationalism, arising not 
from the erhne of murder but fron1 .an expeeted show-
ing of evidence of a deviate homosexual relationship be-
tween two women which never did emerge in the for1n 
of affinnative evidence. Through fourteen days of evj-
rlence, the trial Court consistently ruled with the Dis-
trict Attorney whenever a controversy arose as a matter 
of law or where there was discretion in the Court, and 
often did so smnmarily. 
The Court allowed hearsay evidenee for the State 
over objection in many instances (Point VI), but denied 
the defendant's right to put on evidence material to the 
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issue on the- prosecutor's bare staten1ent that the issues 
were immaterial to the case (Points X, XI, XII, and 
XIV). 
Invariably where a point was argued before the 
jury, the Court sustained the point of view taken by the 
prosecution. Probably the most lucid example of this 
is at R. 569-570, where witness Kuehne had claimed 
privilege against self-incrimination. The District At-
torney informed the Court that it was his opinion that 
Carl Kuehne had waived his privilege by testifying at 
the preliminary hearing. This is so obviously not the 
law that the District Attorney must have been necessarily 
aware of his misstatement. Defense couns·el offered to 
cite cases thereon, but the Court summarily ruled com-
pelling an answer, and did so again and again on 
Kuehne's attempts to claim privilege. 
The Court, over defense's objection and on motion 
of the prosecutor, took the jury to the scene of the homi-
cide although the State did not contend the conditions 
were similar to the night of the killing and had had 
numerous pictures of the area without objection by the 
defense and though the defense did not dispute any of 
the evidence by the State regarding the location or what 
happened at the location other than the presence of the 
defendant at that place at the time of the shooting. 
The Court gav-e all the State's instructions as re-
quested, but refused to give any instructions regarding 
the defense's theory of the case. The best example of 
the Court's attitude is illustrated by the defendant's re-
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'lu":-;t for a <·Prtificate of probable cau~e following judg-
ment and sentene<·. ~rhe 1notion for certificate wa::; 
prp:-;t•ntPd to the Court, together with citations of the 
law showing that the certificate is a 1uatter of right unless 
there i~ no probable theory for appeal, and the request 
i~ factitious or for delay only. The Court asked, "Doe::; 
the State oppose the nwtion" ~ Mr. Leary, appearing for 
Uw State, said, "Yes, we oppose it" but did not argue 
the <tnestion of law. The Court denied the motion (R. 
136) and when asked for a statement of grounds said, 
"The Court has no grounds for the record at this time." 
Off the record but in the presence of Deputy District 
.\ttonwy Peter F. Leary and C.S.R. B. ~I. Goodpasture, 
when pressed for his grounds for denial of the certificate, 
the Court stated: "To be frank with you, Bud, it's a 
matter of public policy." 
The writer is the first to admit that the above two 
paragraphs are not a part of the record, but they graph-
ically illustrate the prejudicial atmosphere of the entire 
trial which deprived the defendant of any semblance of 
substantive due process of the law and the right to be 
tried before an ilnpartial jury and an impartial fonnn. 
Fnited States Constitution, Amendments IY, Y, and \1:, 
as guaranteed by United States Constitution, Alnend-
nwn XIV: Also see State L'. Swenson, supra. 
SUMMARY 
Jean Sinclair was convicted of first degree murder 
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
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Under Points I, 11, Ill, and 1 \', or any e01ubination 
thereof, the judgment should be reversed and the de-
fendant discharged as the defense motions for dismissal 
and for directed verdict were i1nproperly denied. 
On a finding of error on any other point or eum-
bination of points, the case should be reversed and re-
manded for new trial with proper and explicit directions 
to the trial Court. 
The jury, under inadequate instructions regarding 
accomplices and aiding and abetting, and ignoring the 
def.endant's theory of the case entirely, discounted the 
testimony of two doctors as to the defendant's infinnity 
and four alibi witnesses in taking the unsupported testi-
mony of an ex-convict who adn1itted accomplicity, and 
thereon found a verdict of murder in the first degree. 
Theve is no question that the homicide charged was 
an ambush slaying or that the District Attorney pleaded 
for the death penalty. In spite of the cold blooded, lying-
in-wait nature of the killing and the request by the State 
for the death penalty and abs-ence of any plea by the 
defense for leniency, the jury unanimously recommended 
leniency. Can there be any plainer inference that the 
jury ignored the evidence or lack of evidence and con-
victed solely on the oft-inferr-ed but never proved in-
nuendo that there was some kind of homosexual relation-
ship between the defendant and LaRae Peterson~ They 
therefore refused to make an obligatory death penalty 
because there was no evidence on which they could find 
that Jean Sinclair killed Don :B--,oster, but there '"';as an 
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infert'll('(' of a not under~ I ood and apparently undesir-
able and abhorrent ~Pxual relatonship for which the 
defendant was not on trial but for which she should be 
··g·ottPil off tl11• ;-;tn•(_·t~" and away from society. 
The judgment should be reversed and the defendant 
di:'1·haq.!;Pd, or in thP alternative, the judgment should 
be rPvt>rsed and remanded with adequate directions to 
guidP tlw trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant 
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